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ARTICLES
PLEDGING TO GOD WHILE GETTING A
PUBLIC EDUCATION: WHY A WALL OF
SEPARATION DIVIDES CEREMONIAL
CELEBRATION FROM RELIGIOUS
INDOCTRINATION: ELK GROVE UNIFIED
SCHOOL DISTRICT V. NEWDOW AND THE
RIGHT OF PARENTAL PRIVACY
ROD DIXON'
INTRODUCTION

Whether a reference to the word God in a religious text is
distinguishable from a child's utterance of the word God has
become a central concern in the current public discourse about
the relationship between religion and government.
It is axiomatic that the requirement that government remain
"neutral" in matters of religion does not foreclose the government
from ever taking religion into account; stated plainly, neutrality
towards religion need not mean not any religious thing.' Yet

' Rod Dixon is a senior attorney at the U.S. Department of Education. LL.M.,
1998, Georgetown University Law Center; J.D., 1992, George Washington
University Law School; M.A., 1986, University of Pittsburgh; B.A., 1984, University
of Pittsburgh. In this Article, the legal analysis and conclusions expressed belong
solely to the author.
' See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338-39 (1987) (defining the Court's neutrality
concept); see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 422-23 (1963). The doctrine of
neutrality has come under attack by scholars who view the First Amendment's
proscription against a government-established religion as a sense of attachmentamong some of the founding fathers-towards religion that is greater than what
neutrality actually captures. Even the Supreme Court occasionally has embraced, as
acceptable, a doctrinal replacement for neutrality towards religion with equality
among religions. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 714 (1984). This latter
refinement might stand the Court's neutrality doctrine on its head by moving away
from limiting the state's embracement of any religious thing to requiring the state's
engagement of any religious thing. This approach risks mixing equality with liberty
notwithstanding that equality and liberty are not the same and, indeed, are
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these principles betray the hurdles that the government must
surmount when questions of liberty, freedom, and religion
traverse the public square and enter the courtroom.
This Article proceeds in two parts. Part I draws upon the
Supreme Court's leading cases, advancing an evolving doctrine
that has been used to interpret the Establishment Clause as it
applies to public school issues. In light of the leading cases, Part
I asserts that judicial doctrines regarding the Establishment
Clause2 provide increasingly implausible results in resolving
conflicts between the promotion of free expression (particularly
free religious expression) among individuals and the imposition
of constraints against state interference with free expression
when conflicts arise in the public school context and touch upon
religious exercise. 3 Part I concludes by proposing that a way out
of the Court's current affinity for unworkable doctrines is for the
Court to provide due regard for the integration of similar
constitutional interests-the right of parental privacy, the right
of free expression, and the protections of the Establishment
Clause-when addressing disputes involving public schools and
the kulturkampf of religious exercise. Resolving disputes in light
of relevant multi-constitutional interests implants the root for
more satisfactorily safeguarding the liberty interests of parents
and children when conflicts grow out of activities involving public
education.4
What follows in Part II is a pursuit of the argument
regarding the integration of constitutional interests. Part II
develops the argument that questions of liberty, freedom, and
religion should not be resolved by resort to the Establishment
Clause in isolation. Instead, it is argued, that these disputes
should be resolved in light of the full scope of the liberty interest
at stake. Taking this argument a step further, it is argued that

occasionally antithetical. See John Lukacs, When Democracy Goes Wrong, HARPER'S
MAG., Apr. 2005, at 13, 15.
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating that "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof").

'

See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.

819, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[The Court's] Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is in hopeless disarray. . ").
I Public education is emphasized because constitutional interests most often
arise in response to state action. Even so, similar interests may abound in contexts

of private school education due to state or federal statutory rights, or an evolving
sense that the distinctions between public and private in some contexts are illusory.
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the Court should acknowledge that a parent or child might
rely upon courts to integrate constitutional interests under the
First Amendment when disputes involve schools and religion.
This should follow from the Court's long-standing recognition
that our form of limited government provides the sharpest
bulwark of safeguards for parents from state intrusions into the
family unit when state actions, which implicate religion, offend
personal parental decisions concerning the educational welfare of
children.5
To say that the right of privacy is an increasingly important
American value is to state what is apparent in the twenty-first
century. Yet, occasionally, courts seem to echo a different viewa view that seems sundered from context. To avoid such lapses
in public school contexts, the application of basic principles
focused on identifying our societal value for important human
interests-often branded as "privacy" interests-must receive the
Court's respectful attention when public schoolhouse disputes
come before it.6 Toward that end, it is urged that courts must
view the right of privacy as a fundamental liberty interest
reflected through First Amendment liberties.
Conceptualizing privacy anchored in constitutional liberty7
serves to protect privacy interests when they matter most8

' See infra notes 197-211. Quite another question is raised when school
activities involve students, acting independent of school officials, exercising their
right of religious freedom. While it is clear that students cannot be discriminated
against solely due to their religious viewpoint, how best to protect student-initiated
freedom of association involves careful balancing of competing interests from a range
of choices that are outside the scope of this Article. Even so, it is doubtful that purely
associational activities of students should come within the range of activities
constituting state indoctrination of children in religion or state sponsorship of
religious activities.
6

See RIcHARD ELLIOT FELDMAN, WHO WROTE THE BIBLE 58-60 (1987).

Although there were no public schools in the United States in 1776, the early history
of the nation's public schools discloses that American educators assumed that
morality could be derived only from religion, which was understood to be
Christianity, more particularly Protestant Christianity. Id. Not until the nineteenth
century did Protestants-ostensibly forced by Catholics-consider whether their
assumption that public school students could be inculcated with moral teachings
from only one (religious) source was correct. Id. at 62-64, 81.
1 At bottom, questions of liberty ask whether the right of the majority to give
effect to their opinions by enactment of law or through the power of the state may
permissibly burden the constitutional interests of the individual.
8 What is more, because law may influence market behavior, reestablishing the
vitality of the constitutional right of privacy as a liberty interest would have the
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and sheds focused light upon the path toward abandoning
impertinent and indistinctly drawn traditional conceptions of
privacy, including those that fail to reinforce privacy interests as
appropriately framed by the interests and values at stake.
I.

ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE IN PUBLIC SCHOOL

Newdow v. Elk Grove Unified School District9 provides a
particularly appropriate backdrop for launching a reassessment
of the fundamental interests of children and parents that the
state must respect to ensure that no aspect of compulsory public
education is transformed into religious indoctrination. 10 To date,
the Supreme Court's doctrines determining at which point a
citizen's rights of freedom and liberty 1 are infringed by the state
when its actions implicate religion have been infused with
imprecision and controversy.12
likely effect of encouraging private sector entities to begin adopting privacy policies
as a genuine core business value.
9 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (acting on cert granted in Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Newdow, 540 U.S. 945 (2003)), rev'g Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 328 F.3d 466 (9th
Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court in Newdow reversed the Ninth Circuit's opinion in
Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2003) thereinafter Newdow II]. The
U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Newdow.
In Newdow II, the Ninth Circuit is expected to, in addition to potentially reaching
the merits, review whether the reversal dislodges both the precedential and
instructive force of the prior opinion.
10 See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, The Pledge of Allegiance and the Limited State, 8
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 41, 50-51 (2003).
11See supra note 4 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has
acknowledged the freedom and liberty interests that anchor each fundamental right
protected by the Federal Constitution, including those regarding religion.
12 See infra notes 13-17 and accompanying text. The term "controversy" is
an acknowledged understatement. As the words of one commentator well
acknowledged,
[o]f all the issues the ACLU takes on-reproductive rights, discrimination,
jail and prison conditions, abuse of kids in the public schools, police
brutality, to name a few-by far the most volatile issue is that of school
prayer. Aside from our efforts to abolish the death penalty, it is the only
issue that elicits death threats.
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 607 n.10 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting
Parish, GraduationPrayer Violates the Bill of Rights, 4 UTAH BAR J. 19 (June/July
1991)). Indeed, the issue in Newdow is so controversial that Supreme Court
Associate Justice Antonin Scalia chose to recuse himself from hearing the case.
Caprice L. Roberts, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse?: Recusal and the Procedural
Void in the Court of Last Resort, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 107, 123-24 (2004). Justice
Scalia, who often votes in support of government displays of religious phrases or
symbols, did not take part in the Court's decision to hear Newdow. Newdow asked
Scalia to recuse himself. Suggestion for Recusal of Justice Scalia at 1, Elk Grove
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The Court's review in Newdow was expected to squarely
address whether a citizen's rights of freedom and liberty are
13
infringed by the state when its actions implicate religion.
Newdow 14 was to consider the question in the context of the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause. 15 Instead, the Court issued

Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2003) (No. 02-1624). Apparently, Scalia's
public comments about the lower court's ruling in Newdow were viewed as criticism
of the appellate court ruling. See id. Newdow called the Court's attention to remarks
made by Scalia during a speech at a "Religious Freedom Day" observance sponsored
by the Knights of Columbus, a Roman Catholic men's service organization. See id. at
7. During the speech, Scalia observed that his view of the Establishment Clause
included the view that the government was permitted to make "nondenominational
acknowledgements of God" and that doing so merely reflects "the true tradition of
religious freedom in America-a tradition of neutrality among religious faiths." See
JEFFREY ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT: THE PERSONALITIES AND RIVALRIES THAT
DEFINED AMERICA, 197 (2006).

13 Of course, in this context, liberty may mean different things. For example, the
First Amendment encompasses two distinct guarantees-that the government
shall "foreclose not only laws 'respecting an establishment of religion' but also those
'prohibiting the free exercise thereof "-both with the common purpose of
securing religious liberty. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963)
(Goldberg, J., concurring); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 40 (1947) (Rutledge,
J., dissenting) ("'Establishment' and 'free exercise' were correlative and coextensive
ideas, representing only different facets of the single great and fundamental
freedom.").
14 Though for some, a reference to God in a pledge merely connotes a nonreligious message, for others, no doubt, like with prayer, a pledge to God, regardless
of context, denotes a sincere, deeply held religious belief in the communicative
content. In this Article, the analysis does not embrace this broader debate. Instead,
the concern here is with pledging by children in a public school context. The Pledge
as we know it today: "'I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of
America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation under God, indivisible,
with liberty and justice for all.' "4 U.S.C. § 4 (2006).
15 The Religion Clauses apply to the states by incorporation into the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). Judicial rulings
involving the Establishment Clause have held that the Clause, at least, means that
[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain
away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or
disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support
any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or
whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state
nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the
affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.
Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16.
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an opinion leaving the central issues in Newdow unresolved. 6
The issues in Newdow provided a particularly appropriate
context for a thorough reassessment of the fundamental interests
of children and parents that the state must respect to ensure
that compulsory public education is never transformed into
religious indoctrination. 17 An early stage of this reassessment is
undertaken by examining the following illustrative cases.
A.

Cases

1.

Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow

Michael Newdow, a California father professionally trained
as a doctor and a lawyer, wanted the words "under God" removed
Newdow argued that his
from the Pledge of Allegiance."8
daughter, who attended the second grade at a public school near
Sacramento, California, had to listen to the teacher-led Pledge
and that it constituted a daily religious indoctrination. 9 The
California law required the Pledge to be recited once, each day at
public elementary schools.20 The words "under God" were added
to the Pledge as part of a 1954 law adopted by Congress in an
apparent effort to distinguish America's religious values and
heritage from those of communism. 2 ' In reciting the Pledge,

with Mr. Newdow's standing, and these
'" The Court identified problems
problems kept the Court from reaching the merits; hence, the Court of Appeals'
judgment was vacated, and the Pledge with "under God" remains valid in the Ninth
Circuit. See Newdow, 542 U.S. 17-18 (reversing the circuit court's decision based
upon a lack of prudential standing, not on the merits).
17 It may be that the Establishment Clause "cannot easily be reduced to a single
test. There are different categories of Establishment Clause cases, which may
call for different approaches." Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 720 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
18 Newdow 11, 292 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 2003). The mother, Sandra Banning,
who has custody of the Newdow child, reportedly wanted her daughter to say the
Pledge. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 9.
1 Newdow 11, 292 F.3d at 611.
20 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52720 (West 2009). The relevant portion reads:
In every public elementary school each day during the school year at the
beginning of the first regularly scheduled class or activity period at which
the majority of the pupils of the school normally begin the schoolday, there
shall be conducted appropriate patriotic exercises. The giving of the Pledge
of Allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America shall satisfy the
requirements of this section.
Id.
21 Pub. L. No. 396, ch. 297, 68 Stat. 249 (1954). The Pledge was written in the
late 1800s and was first placed in the United States Code without "under God" in
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students pledge allegiance to the American flag and "'to the
Republic for which it stands, one Nation under God, indivisible,
with liberty and justice for all.' "22
Michael Newdow 23 sued to challenge the public school policy
as it applied to his nine-year-old daughter. Newdow argued
that the policy violated the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment, and the Ninth Circuit, by a two-to-one vote,
24
agreed.
Newdow asserted that the public school policy infringed
on his right to expose his daughter to his religious views. He
argued that the public school policy requiring teachers to lead
students in reciting the Pledge of Allegiance violated the First
Amendment bar against public school endorsement of religion. A
decision on the merits of the dispute by the Supreme Court was
arrested due to a challenge to Michael Newdow's ability to legally
25
file suit.
In this regard, and as a general matter, a party seeking
relief from a federal court must establish, as a condition
precedent to a review of the merits, that the litigant has the right
to request that the court decide the merits of the dispute.26
1942. Pub. L. No. 623, ch. 435, § 7, 56 Stat. 380 (1942). On June 22, 1942, Congress
first codified the Pledge without a reference to God: "I pledge allegiance to the flag of
the United States of America and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation
indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." Id. In 1954, legislation was proposed and
subsequently adopted to amend the Pledge to include the words "under God". H.R.
REP. No. 83-1693 (1954) reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2339, 2340.
22 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2006).
23 Newdow represented himself in the Supreme Court. See Newdow 542 U.S. at
2.
24 Newdow 11, 292 F.3d at 612.
25 Subsequently, Newdow filed another suit challenging the Pledge, and, on
September 14, 2005, a federal district court ruled in his favor, finding that the
recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools is unconstitutional. Newdow
v. Cong. of U.S., 383 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1242 (E.D. Cal. 2005). In a press release
dated September 14, 2005, the U.S. Department of Justice indicated that the
federal government would likely appeal the court's ruling. Noting that "official
acknowledgments of our Nation's religious heritage, foundation, and character
are constitutional," the press release then advised that the federal government
would "continue vigorously to defend the ability of American schoolchildren to
pledge allegiance to the flag." See Press Release, Statement of Attorney General
Alberto R. Gonzales on the Pledge of Allegiance Case (Sept. 14, 2005), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/September/05-ag_479.htm. Newdow also has
contested references to God made in formal congressional proceedings, and an
increasing number of activists are asserting various political and legal challenges to
the reference to God in the Pledge.
" See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
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Michael Newdow, as the party bringing the legal challenge to
the state's actions, had to establish that he could file suit to
challenge the school district's policy. 7 In other words, Newdow
had to establish standing.
In August 2002, Newdow's spouse, the child's mother, filed a
motion for leave to intervene or dismiss the complaint following
the Court of Appeals' initial decision. At that time, the child's
custody was governed by a February 6, 2002, order of the
California Superior Court. That order provided that Newdow's
spouse had sole legal custody of her daughter.28 The order
required that the two parents consult with one another on
substantial decisions relating to the child's psychological and
educational needs but authorized only the mother to exercise
legal control if the parents could not reach mutual agreement.29
The U.S. Supreme Court noted that California's Domestic
Relations Law provided the pertinent legal rule defining parental
status.30 As such, the Court viewed it as imprudent for federal
courts to entertain a claim by a plaintiff whose standing to sue is
ostensibly restricted by state law.3 1 The Court noted that it had
often imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction,
particularly in the context of domestic relations, by recognizing a

See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-62 (1992).
28 Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 313 F.3d 500, 502 (9th Cir. 2002).
27

29

Id.

Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 16 (2003). Similarly,
federal constitutional law has long considered the parental right of privacy an
individual right, despite the reference to a parental unit. As the Court emphasized
in Eisenstadt v. Baird, for example,
the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its
own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual
and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child.
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1965). Although the Eisenstadt Court had
made this point in upholding the right of single persons to use contraceptives, the
Supreme Court subsequently quoted the same passage to emphasize that a married
woman was free to assert her own privacy interests in abortion against the
independent and conflicting procreative interests of her husband. See Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 896 (1992); Planned Parenthood of
Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 70 & n.11 (1976).
30

"' Newdow, 542 U.S. at 17.
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prudential standing limitation on a potential litigant's ability to
raise another person's legal rights.3 2
Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred with the majority's
judgment but dissented-joined by Justices O'Connor and
Thomas-with the majority's holding on standing.3 3 Notably,
Rehnquist delved into the merits of Newdow's claimnotwithstanding the standing issue-and concluded that the
requirement that schools begin the day with the Pledge of
Allegiance did not violate the Establishment Clause because of
34
the voluntary nature of the policy.
For Rehnquist, recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in
public school was akin to any public observance wherein a
"4patriotic invocation[] of God" occurred.3 5 Although Rehnquist
conceded that a part of the Pledge of Allegiance is a conspicuous
assertion of religious expression, this provided no constitutional
concern because the phrase "under God" was demonstrative of
the attitude among the nation's leaders to publicly acknowledge
the generalized role of religion in the nation's history.3 6
Rehnquist did not identify the precise contours of the role of
religion in the United States' history, nor did he address the
robust debate among the founding fathers about the admixture of
state and religion.3
Rehnquist's position seems to rest largely on his view that
recitation of the Pledge is a patriotic exercise designed to foster
national unity and pride in the nation by requiring participants
of the recitation to promise fidelity to our flag and our nation, not
to any particular god.3" Rehnquist's analysis, however, says very
little about the voluntary nature of the recitation of the Pledge in
a public school classroom.
Moreover, Rehnquist's dissent stands a fundamental right on
its head when he urges that the Court not "extend constitutional
32 See id. at 12-13; see also Warth v Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (finding

that the standing doctrine embraces the general prohibition on a litigant raising
another person's legal rights).
13 See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 18 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
34 See id. at 18, 30-31.
35 Id. at 26.
31 See id. at 30.
37 See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-16 (1947) (describing the
history behind the Establishment Clause and its meaning).
38 See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 31; see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405
(1989) ("The very purpose of a national flag is to serve as a symbol of our
country ....
).
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prohibitions beyond their previously recognized limit [when
doing so] may restrict democratic choices made by public bodies"
in cases respecting fundamental rights. 9 One could hardly
imagine the Court supporting this type of doctrinal flip-flop in
First Amendment cases because the Court has rarely been
halting in expanding the scope of the Freedom of Expression
Clause to reach novel circumstances, despite democratic choices
made and expressed in legislative enactments. 4° This is for good
reason, as developed more fully in Part II.
Taking a different path, Justice O'Connor, in her
concurrence, recognized that the Court's evolving approach
under the Establishment Clause was dangerously headed toward
"adopting a subjective approach [that] would reduce the
[Establishment Clause's constitutional] test to an absurdity."'"
To thwart this trend, O'Connor argued that the Court's doctrinal
approach to the Establishment Clause must be infused with a
sensible awareness of "the dizzying religious heterogeneity of our
Nation."4 2 For O'Connor, "some references to religion in public
life and government are the inevitable consequence" of the
nation's history and traditions,43 but consonant with that is the
fundamental principle that there are "no de minimis violations of

" Newdow, 542 U.S. at 32. Although the Supreme Court has never defined
precisely what a fundamental right is, the Court often includes as hndamental the
individual rights set forth in the Bill of Rights and, occasionally, those rights
generally denominated as natural rights. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 756-57 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (noting the "constitutional practice
in recognizing unenumerated, substantive limits on governmental action"); Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1905) (holding that the right of contract is
protected under the "liberty" aspect of the Fourteenth Amendment). What is more,
when the government is alleged to have infringed or burdened a fundamental right,
strict scrutiny of the government's conduct usually follows. See Pickering v. Bd.
of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573-74 (1968). But see Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens
on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175, 1199 (1996) (noting that strict
scrutiny is not always applied to violations of fundamental rights).
41 See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 165-66
(2002) (holding that the First Amendment prohibited a town from requiring door-todoor advocates to register with the mayor even though the registration was issued
automatically); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 415-16 (holding that the First Amendment
prohibited the government from criminalizing flag burning when the statute was
aimed at expressive conduct).
41 Newdow, 542 U.S. at 35 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
42 Id. at 34-35.

Id. at 35 (2004); see also id. at 35-36 ("It is unsurprising that a Nation
founded by religious refugees and dedicated to religious freedom should find
references to divinity in its symbols, songs, mottoes, and oaths.").
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the Constitution-no constitutional harms so slight that the
courts are obliged to ignore them." 4 According to O'Connor, the
recitation of the Pledge in public school cannot be cabined off as
presumptively permissible regardless of whether "a reasonable
observer, fully cognizant of the history, ubiquity, and context of
that the state's conduct
the practice in question" would conclude
45
constituted "an instance of worship."
Applying this test in Newdow, O'Connor concluded that
she knew of neither a "religion that incorporates the Pledge into
its canon, nor one that would count the Pledge as a meaningful
expression of religious faith."46 As such, O'Connor concluded,
a reasonable person standard would lead to the conclusion
that the phrase is merely descriptive or "purports only to
identify the United States as a Nation subject to divine
authority," which should not "be seen as a serious invocation
of God or as an expression of individual submission to
divine authority." 47 This conclusion, however, runs counter to
O'Connor's acknowledgement that there are no de minimis
violations of the Constitution and no constitutional harms so
slight that the Court should ignore them. Like Rehnquist,
O'Connor's approach is not grounded in the vicissitudes of the
public school classroom. That school children are required to
pledge allegiance to a nation purporting to be subject to divine
authority remains unaddressed by O'Connor's analysis.48
Of the dissenters, only Justice Thomas observed that the
definition of "coercion" was the critical issue in the Court's
jurisprudence on the Establishment Clause in public school
cases.4 9 Thomas noted that the Court's current jurisprudence
"would require [the Court] to strike down the Pledge policy,
which, in most respects, poses more serious difficulties than the
prayer at issue in Lee [v. Weisman]."10 In Thomas' view, Newdow
was also more troublesome than the other dissenters had
41 Id. at 36-37.

" Id. at 40.
46 Id.
47 Id.
4s The Court already has determined that schools may permit students who

object on religious grounds to abstain from the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance.
See id. at 30 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (citing W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
41 Id. at 45, 49 (Thomas, J., concurring).
,o Id. at 46.
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acknowledged because in Newdow the students are "actually
compelled (that is, by law, and not merely 'in a fair and real
sense,') to attend school," and unwilling children are actually
forced into "pledging their allegiance." 1
For Thomas, as a matter of precedent and consistent with
the rule of stare decisis, the Pledge policy is unconstitutional.52
Although Thomas concluded that Newdow would prevail on the
merits, he did not agree that he should prevail. 3 Instead,
Thomas preferred to overrule Lee v. Weisman 54 on grounds
that the holding in that case depended on a notion of "coercion"
that had "no basis in law or reason," and that the "kind of
coercion implicated by the Religion Clauses" is that which is
accomplished "by force of law and threat of penalty. ' 55 Moreover,
for Thomas, "the Establishment Clause is best understood as a
federalism provision-it protects state establishments from
federal interference but does not protect any individual right."56
Justice Thomas may have the better view. First, Thomas
instructs that legal coercion of pledging to "God" in a public
school setting is inconsistent with faithful adherence to First
Amendment doctrine.57 Second, Thomas calls attention to the
serious debate regarding whether the Bill of Rights ought to
apply to the states in their entirety. In that regard, Thomas
would reexamine the incorporation doctrine and hold that the
Establishment Clause bars the federal government's actions, but
imposes no bar to state endorsement of religion.5" Thomas' legal
philosophy on the Bill of Rights may warrant no traction in the
Court's more pragmatic attempts to remain faithful to prevailing
precedent, but he seems to frame the Establishment Clause issue
in the proper context of public schools, which Rehnquist and
O'Connor failed to do. Thomas' fidelity to precedent results in an
analysis that appears helpful to Newdow's claim but, ultimately,
is not. Justice Thomas indicates that his goal is to alter the
Court's Establishment Clause doctrine in a manner that would
51 Id.

at 47 (citation omitted).
52 Id. at 49.
See id.
54 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
15 Newdow, 542 U.S. at 49 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
56 Id.at 50 (emphasis omitted).
51 See id. at 46-47.
5 See id. at 50.
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significantly weaken the Clause's limit on government power to
mix state action with religious exercise. 9
As developed more fully below, the issue in Newdow is better
framed as raising the liberty interests of child and parents.6 ° In
framing the matter as a liberty interest, the Court may draw
upon the Constitution's first principles6 1 regarding free speech,
religious expression, and the protection of parental privacy.62
As the dissents in Newdow acknowledge, the Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence draws a fuzzy distinction between
what constitutes an endorsement of religion and what is an
accommodation of the free expression of religion. Although some
expressions serve to solemnize a public occasion with a reference
to "God," deeming some of these expressions constitutional and
others unconstitutional shifts the Establishment Clause doctrine
from its focus on the critical question of what constitutes an
endorsement of religion to a largely out-of-focus objective
concerning the accommodation of degrees of religiosity. To frame
a sharp focus on the kind of coercion implicated by the
Establishment Clause, the Court must shrug off urges to
substitute illuminating clearness of logic and rationality with the
darkness of convention and the dogmatic confidence of conviction.
Similarly, some commentators argue that those who urge
that government-sponsored reverence of anything associated
with religion runs afoul of the First Amendment have reduced
the Establishment Clause to banality. An acknowledgement of
$' See id. at 51.
60 See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. 577, 594-96 (1992) (recognizing that the relevant
community under the Establishment Clause in the context of public school education
would be parents, rather than children, since parents are likely to choose whether
their children will participate in ceremonial exercises targeted toward school
children).
61
In 1965, the Supreme Court held in Griswold v. Connecticut, that there was a
clearly established right of privacy protected by the Federal Constitution. 381 U.S.
479, 484-86 (1965). The Court held that a Connecticut contraceptive statute was
unconstitutional as applied to a married couple. Id. at 485-86.
62 As discussed more fully below, the modern conception of privacy is anchored
in our understanding of liberty, not that liberty always is what the Court is
signifying in its jurisprudence on privacy. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING
THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 334 (2004) (urging that the

Court, led by Justice Kennedy, is reshaping privacy as the right identified by earlier
courts of substantive due process or liberty). Though the Court may be switching
gears by replacing privacy with liberty without explicit acknowledgement, doing so
does not diminish the right's vitality or inappropriately realign its doctrinal
substance.

JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 48:147

160

"God" by the state, it is said, is permissible because an
acknowledgement of the existence of "God" has no more
significance to religion than an acknowledgement of a belief in
the "Force" by a Jedi Knight of Star Wars.63 Of course, a religion
(and only religion) may rest upon the belief of a divinity.
Likewise, the argument or proposition "that America is a nation
under God"64 logically must include acceptance of the existence of
"God" and a belief in "God."6 5 In this regard, no matter how de
minimis one might dare to quantify, as Justice Thomas urged,
the Pledge, on its face, constitutes a religious expression.6 6
The recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance also constitutes a
matter of concern apart from its explicit religious expression.
The Pledge, when recited by schoolchildren, is beyond
"ceremonial celebration" or educational recitation because
students must utter the words "under God" in unison in the same
manner that an adult recites a solemn oath.6 7 In other words,
the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance is a speech act.6" The
act of pledging requires affirming alliance to the nation as well as
expressing by affirmation a belief that there is a god above the
nation. As such, a pledge is a performative vow or oath that the
speaker is presently offering.69 Of course, as evident in the case
63

See, e.g., Michael M. Maddigan, The Establishment Clause, Civil Religion, and

the Public Church, 81 CAL. L. REV. 293, 326 (1993).

4 U.S.C. § 4 (2006).
Neither premise can be viewed fairly as neutral since many religions consider
an affirmance of "God's" existence as a pillar of religious doctrine.
66 See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 48 (2004) (Thomas,
J., concurring). To the extent that there are genuinely non-theistic religions, a
reference to only theistic religions in the pledge still presents obvious neutrality
problems under the Establishment Clause.
67 Indeed, for adults, oaths and pledges were highly contentious matters during
the colonial era, not solely for those who refused to swear, but also for those who
identified oaths as inconsistent with notions of freedom of conscience. See Michael
W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1475 (1990).
66 Interestingly enough, although actions may speak louder than words, not so
when the words constitute actions themselves. Generally, we have learned from the
contributions in the fields of linguistics and grammar that "speech act" describes a
performative utterance or illocutionary act that may be performed by the explicit act
of speaking (for example: praying, promising, pledging, vowing). See JOHN R.
65

SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 64-65 (1969).

Hence, a child's words become his actions while reciting the Pledge.
69 See McConnell, supra note 67, at 1516. Compare Bown v. Gwinnett County
Sch. Dist., 112 F.3d 1464 (11th Cir. 1997) (upholding a moment of silence law that
did not encourage prayer), with Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59-61 (1985)
(striking down moment of silence law that, in context, encouraged prayer because
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that follows, if a state action has a predominantly secular
purpose, a court may conclude that the state action does not
unduly burden parental rights to control a child's religious
upbringing.
Although a reasonable argument may be made that the
phrase "under God" in the Pledge sums up the attitude of a
majority in the nation to invoke "God" in public observances
and that the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance is a patriotic
exercise, not a religious one, the history of the nation renders
it indisputable that invoking "God" in the nation's public
observances constitutes a reference not just to a god, but to the
Judeo-Christian"God."7 ° Even so, as a normative matter, it is
unclear what is meant by the phrase "under God. '71 Except in
the most figurative of uses, such as in a literary or, perhaps,
fictionalized account, this phrase is meaningless without
reference to a specific text belonging to a particular religion, sect,
or set of identifiable religious views. Indeed, the assumption that
the expression "under God" is not an expression of a particular
religious viewpoint illustrates how some widely held religious
traditions exclude religious traditions that are nontheistic.
the silence would communicate graphically that the existence of a higher power over
the state is a possibility, even though the state cannot make declarations about it).
70 In Newdow, Justice O'Connor agreed with Chief Justice Rehnquist's appeal to
the nation's traditions but concluded that the phrase "under God" in the Pledge
constitutes nothing more than an instance of "ceremonial deism," which, in
O'Connor's view, contains no reference to any particular religion. See Newdow, 542
U.S. at 37 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Of course, this perspective itself is illustrative
of the pernicious effect of too closely tying a religious view with the power of the
state. Justice O'Connor appears unable or unwilling to acknowledge not only that a
reference to "God" certainly excludes religious perspectives that do not include a
singular god or a god at all, but that it says nothing about the nation's traditions,
which clearly anchor references to "God" in seventeenth and eighteenth century
state enactments in a Judeo-Christian god. In contrast, Buddhists, for example,
seem to agree that Buddha's awakening or enlightenment did not involve an
encounter with "God," a god, or even the receipt of truths from a deity. See DONALD
S. LOPEZ, JR., THE STORY OF BUDDHISM: A CONCISE GUIDE TO ITS HISTORY AND
TEACHINGS 37-42 (2001). Indeed, Buddhist doctrine emphasizes the importance of

nontheism in Buddha's enlightenment. Hence, Buddhists are taught to view the
world simply, directly, and with the perception achieved in insight meditation. See
MICHAEL CARRITHERS, THE BUDDHA 72 (1983).
7 A working definition of "God," for monotheistic religions, such as Christianity,
Judaism, and Islam, might include "the Being perfect in power, wisdom, and
goodness who is worshipped as creator and ruler of the universe," but this definition
neither fully conveys the meaning of "under God," nor clarifies what it means to

convey such a meaning in an act of pledging. MERRIAM-WEBSTER, INC., MERRIAMWEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 500 (10th ed. 1997).
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What matters for purposes of the Establishment Clause in
the context of public school education is that the school's
activities provide no real danger that the school or that the state
endorses religion or any particular religious doctrine.7 2 To avoid
violating the Establishment Clause, the Government must not
treat people differently based on the god or gods they worship or
73
do not worship.
In the context of Newdow, the ceremonial quality of reciting
a pledge heightens the close association of rituals with religious
observance-an association that is likely to be enhanced in the
minds of most youths. Students are susceptible to pressure in
the classroom, particularly given their possible reliance on
teachers as role models. 4
In the case that follows, the Court took a different path from
the dissenters in Newdow and presented the Establishment
Clause issue in the context of state action requiring that schools
begin each day with readings from the Bible. Viewing the basic
question in light of the history of the First Amendment, the
Court concluded that the First Amendment, while protecting all
religions, prefers none and disparages none.75 Notably, the Court
recognized that the fundamental concept of liberty is a guarantee
that the First Amendment embodies.76
2.

School District of Abington Township v. Schempp

In School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, the
Court agreed to decide whether the Pennsylvania law and
Abington's policy, requiring public school students to participate
in classroom religious exercises, violated the religious freedom of
72 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 84243 (1995) ("It does not violate the Establishment Clause for a public university to
grant access to its facilities on a religion-neutral basis to a wide spectrum of student
groups.").
13 Newdow's complaint assumed that the Pledge's reference to "God" was a
reference to monotheism, which could offend those who did not believe in the
existence of "God" or of merely one god. See Newdow v. Cong. of the U.S., 383 F.
Supp. 2d 1229, 1236 (E.D. Cal. 2005).
74See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987).
15 See Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214-15 (1963). The Free Exercise
Clause secures religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions
thereof by civil authority. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. In other words, the free exercise
of religion is violated where the government's coercive effect operates against an
individual in the practice of his or her religion.
76 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 215-16.
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parents and students as protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. v" The Court concluded that the public school
district violated both the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause because the readings and recitations were
essentially religious ceremonies and were intended by the state
to be so-that is, the ceremonies did not serve a predominant
secular purpose.78
According to the Schempp Court, the First Amendment's
purpose is not merely to strike at an official establishment of a
religious sect or creed, as had prevailed in England, but to bestir
Americans, if necessary, by uprooting public spheres of religious
activity entangled with state authority. Notwithstanding that
Schermpp's jurisprudence is now long established in First
Amendment doctrine, the Court has recently conspicuously
begun to question the logic and efficacy of Schempp.79
Schempp reinforced that the government must maintain
neutrality to ensure "the right of every person to freely choose his
own [religious] course. . . free of any compulsion from the
state." 0 The Court asserted that if the purpose and the primary
effect of an enactment is the "advancement or inhibition of
religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative
power as circumscribed by the [Establishment Clause]. " "1
According to the Court, there must be a "secular legislative
purpose... [and a] primary effect.., that neither advances nor
inhibits religion."82 Applying Establishment Clause principles to
the facts in Schempp, the Court found that the required reading
of Bible verses and recitation of the Lord's Prayer by the
students, in unison, at the opening of the school day violated the
Establishment Clause.8 3 Although the neutrality test supported
by Schempp-that there must be a secular legislative purpose
Id. (quoting Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)).
78 Id. at 222-24.

9 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 643 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(questioning the continued vitality of Schempp).
8 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222.
81 Id.

82 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236, 243 (1968)). Lemon sets out a three-prong test: "First, the statute must
have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion. . . finally, the statute must not
foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.' "Id. at 612-13 (quoting
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
' Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223.
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and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religionappears suitable to public school issues like those raised in
Newdow, it focuses analysis on motives or intent of government
with little balancing between government and parental interests.
In the case that follows, the Court extended the neutrality
principle-requiring evenhanded treatment of all who believe,
doubt, or disbelieve-to assessing state actions in a public school
ceremonial context for indications of coercion. 4
3.

Lee v. Weisman
In Lee v. Weisman, principals of public middle schools and
high schools in Providence, Rhode Island permitted members of
the clergy to give invocations and benedictions at their schools'
graduation ceremonies.8 5 A middle school principal invited a rabbi
to offer prayers at the graduation ceremony for Deborah
Weisman's class and gave the Rabbi a pamphlet containing
guidelines for the composition of public prayers at civic
ceremonies.
Weisman's father sought a restraining order to
prohibit school officials from including the prayers in the
ceremony.8 7 Deborah and her family attended the ceremony, and
the prayers were recited. Subsequently, Weisman sought a
permanent injunction barring Lee and other petitioners-various
Providence public school officials-"from inviting clergy to deliver
invocations and benedictions at future graduations. 8 8 The Court
determined that the Establishment Clause forbids the offer of
prayers8 9 as part of an official public school graduation ceremony
because the government may not coerce anyone to support or

4 Cf Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 791-92 (1983) (permitting the
government, in some instances, to refer to or commemorate religion in public life). In
Marsh, the Court upheld Nebraska's two-hundred-year-old practice of opening its
state legislative sessions with a prayer offered by a chaplain. Id. at 792-93. The
Court, however, also has acknowledged that "one of the greatest dangers to the
freedom of the individual to worship in his own way [lies] in the Government's

placing its official stamp of approval upon one particular kind of prayer or one
particular form of religious services." Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429 (1962).
1, Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580 (1992).
8
87
8
89

Id. at 581.
Id. at 584.
Id.
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309 (2000) ("[Tlhe use of an

invocation to foster ... solemnity is impermissible when, in actuality, it constitutes
[state-sponsored] prayer.
").
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participate in religion, its exercise, or otherwise act in a way that
establishes a state religion or religious faith.9"
The Court recognized that a ceremonial celebration, in the
hands of government, might end in a policy to indoctrinate and
coerce. Prayer exercises in elementary and secondary schools,
for example, carry a particular risk of indirect coercion. 91
Consequently, the Court reasoned, the school district's supervision
and control of a high school graduation ceremony places public and
peer pressure on attending students. The Court forbade the state
from placing a student in the dilemma of participating or
protesting a ceremonial celebration from which he or she
dissented. In the Court's view-as Justice Thomas noted in
Newdow-the embarrassment and intrusion of the religious
exercise cannot be refuted by arguing that the state action is of a
de minimis character; praying to God, like pledging on behalf or
affirming God's existence, is not a minimal state action in the
context of public school.92
90 Lee, 505 U.S. at 587. It might be said that the Supreme Court has used at
least three plausibly distinguishable tests to analyze alleged violations of the
Establishment Clause in the realm of public education: the so-called "Lemon test"
set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971), the "endorsement
test," adopted by the Court in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592-94
(1989), and the "coercion test" extended in Lee, 505 U.S. at 621. More directly,
Justice O'Connor has noted that the Establishment Clause "cannot easily be reduced
to a single test. There are different categories of Establishment Clause cases, which
may call for different approaches." Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 720 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Scalia's dissent in Lee criticizes the majority's
coercion test as boundless and inconsistent with precedent. Lee, 505 U.S. at 631-32
(Scalia, J., dissenting). In fact, as Justice Scalia notes, the majority is less than clear
about the contours of coercion. Id. at 640. Missing from the Court's analysis is a
clear indication of the types of coercion, if any, which would be within the bounds of
the Establishment Clause.
91 See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 578; Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 316 (1963);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 441-42 (1962).
92 This seems supported by the Court's further instruction in Santa Fe, where
the Court upheld a facial challenge to a school district's policy of permitting, but not
requiring, prayer initiated and led by a student at high school football games. Santa
Fe Ind. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 301. The Court further held that the "mere passage by
the District of a policy that has the purpose and perception of government
establishment of religion" violated the Establishment Clause. Id. at 314. In referring
to the purported Establishment Clause endorsement test, the Court explained that
it could not "turn a blind eye to the context in which this policy arose, and that
context quells any doubt that this policy was implemented with the purpose of
endorsing school prayer." Id. at 315. In the Court's view, "an objective observer,
acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute,
would perceive [the state conduct] as a state endorsement of prayer in public
schools." Id. at 308 (citation omitted).
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In this respect, the Court rejected the option provided by the
school district of not attending the ceremony. The option did not
excuse any inducement or coercion in the ceremony itself. It was
apparent to the Court that high school graduation is one of
life's most significant occasions, and therefore, cannot compare
with an activity among adults "where adults are free to enter
and leave with little comment and for any number of reasons."93
Thus, a student is not genuinely free to decide not to attend
commencement exercises in any real sense of the term voluntary.
The Weisman Court recognized that an act may have differing
meanings for those who observe the act and that the state's
meaning or interpretation is not dispositive of the Establishment
Clause analysis because what is for many a spiritual act may be
for others either devoid of spirituality or an entirely religious
conformance compelled by the state.94 As Justice Thomas urged
in Newdow, fidelity to the coercive effects test should result
in Newdow prevailing in his challenge of the school district
exercise."
But the coercive effects test can twist and turn
conceptions of coercion in opposing directions, highlighting the
frailty of the test. To give genuine effect to the interests
underlying the Establishment Clause in the public school context,
courts must be cognizant of how those interests reinforce the
values at stake for parents and children when the litigant seeks to
limit the overreach of government's religious exercise in public
school.
In doing so, courts carefully ensure the vitality of

9 Lee, 505 U.S. at 597.
9 The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that the government
cannot force us to proclaim our allegiance to any creed, whether it is religious or
anti-religious. See W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). As
Justice Thomas suggested, Barnette's protection would be illusory if dissenting
students sitting in respectful silence could be mistaken for assent to or participation
in a state-sponsored religious expression, rather than acknowledge that this would
be coerced participation. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow 542 U.S. 1, 47
(2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). The coercion results in unwilling
students actually pledging their allegiance and affirmation that God exists. Whether
or not we classify affirming the existence of God as an acknowledgement of the
nation's tradition or a formal ceremonial religious exercise, the state-sponsored
expression presents a conspicuous constitutional problem of religious indoctrination.
Although an affirmation of God's existence may not rise to the level of a prayer, if
religious expressions may be sensibly distinguished in such a manner, the Court
already has held that the government cannot require a person to "declare his belief
in God." Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 489 (1961); see also Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
" Newdow, 542 U.S. at 47.
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American democracy by steadfastly
scrutinizing, when
appropriate, the results of majoritarian rule; this role of the
courts includes staying the hand of government when that hand
reaches inside the religious affairs of parents and children who
attend public school.
Taken together, these cases are illustrative of the prevailing
Establishment Clause jurisprudence used by courts to determine
whether state action is enshrouded in coercive religious
ceremony having no secular purpose. These cases show that the
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence does not result in
predictable results regarding whether the Constitution forbids a
particular religious activity in public school. In failing to yield
predictable results, the Court's jurisprudence is not best serving
the rights of parents to shape the religious education of their
children. A better way to assess the legitimacy of religious
exercise in public school arises from framing the constitutional
question with reference to the preferences of a parent or parents.
Doing so invokes more than a singular constitutional doctrine.
The Establishment Clause and the right of parental privacy are
in play in this analysis. That is, in the public school context,
Establishment Clause violations must be assessed against both
the strength of the parental right of privacy at stake and the
coercive tendency of student participation in a school-sponsored
religious exercise. In this light, even school-sponsored religious
exercises having arguably nominal coercive impact upon
students will not pass constitutional scrutiny where a widely
acknowledged parental right of privacy is at stake; the stronger
the parental right of privacy, the less tolerant the court must be
in its assessment of the degree of coercion permitted in the
school-sponsored religious exercise.
B.

FundamentalRights

Fundamental rights might be viewed as a bulwark against
the majoritarian tyranny of some by those empowered in a
democracy with the rule of the majority. State action that
significantly impinges upon parental privacy ought to predictably
require the state to prove that its interference with religious
freedom is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state
interest.
The Constitution's Religion Clauses and the
fundamental right of privacy reinforce the long-standing
American values that majority political power should not
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trammel the fundamental rights of those in the minority. 96 While
the political preferences of the majority often prevail, the Court's
jurisprudence should guard against the notion that the will of the
majority-simply because of majority power-always balances
favorably against those fundamental rights urged by individuals
who express a minority religious viewpoint. In this respect, the
protection of fundamental rights expands beyond the political
preferences of the majority; indeed, it might be said that, at
bottom, what is fundamental about fundamental rights is that
such rights reach beyond the interests of the majority to protect
those interests that may be opposed to the majority.97
It is frequently the case that those who seek judicial
protection of fundamental rights express interests of those who
are disempowered. But for the moral principles protecting
fundamental rights, slavery might never have ended, and civil
rights might never have been enacted. The Court's jurisprudence
emanating from the Constitution's Religious Freedom Clausesprotections of religious freedom and against state-sponsored
religious establishment-reinforce the American value that
religious beliefs are personal and private choices in the most
fundamental sense. Although the distinction between religious
acknowledgement and religious indoctrination is often unclear,
courts oblige their duty to provide genuine judicial protections
pursuant to the Religious Freedom Clauses by ensuring that an
individual's religious belief is not threatened by state sanction
merely because of majoritarian support of contrary views.
There is no doubt that the First Amendment in its broadest
and most comprehensive scope protects the freedom of belief.
Hence, no law banning specified ontological viewpoints could be
deemed permissible under the First Amendment. Similarly,
state mandates that have essentially the same effect as
sanctioning one system of religious belief while pushing-out or
shedding bad light upon a minority religious belief should never
be deemed permissible under our Federal Constitution. Still, a
Even in the sphere of commercial interests, the Constitution has protected
fundamental rights against the "sudden and strong passions" of majority rule. See
ROSEN, supra note 12, at 56-57 (noting the Supreme Court's decision in Fletcher v.
Peck, 10 U.S. 82 (1810), which upheld the fundamental right of contract against
majoritarian tyranny).
97 Because democracy is more than formalized populism, majority rule is
tempered by the protection of the rights of those in the non-majority. See Lukacs,
supra note 1, at 3.
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court may be reluctant to stay the hand of legislative or executive
power that is exercised under the imprimatur of the will of the
majority. This is especially so when the people's will is denoted
by the most obvious form of legitimacy in a democracy: success in
the political process. Consequently, Part II assesses the moral
justification for the legal enforcement of majoritarian political
power in the context of asserting a right or interest that may
countermand majority will.
II. THE INTEGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
Liberty and the Legal Enforcement of MajoritarianMorality
The Court has never accepted the notion that the will of the
majority must always balance favorably against those rights
urged by individuals whose religious viewpoints depart from the
majority. The historical fact that most Americans self-identify as
Christian, or, at least, hold a religious view, should not, itself,
undermine judicial protection of fundamental rights."a Indeed,
the nation's experience with the rule of law and with extending
legal protections for women, disabled individuals, and AfricanAmericans illustrate that moral principles protecting nonmajority interests imbue American democracy. 99
In this regard, the protection of fundamental rights °°
expands beyond the political preferences of the majority;
fundamental rights protect the interests of those who are
disempowered. 10 '

A.

98 H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 1 (1963) (noting that it is a basic
historical fact that the development of law is influenced by morals).

9 Because in purely political terms, majoritarian rule is not necessarily
coterminous with numerical majority, courts often become the focus of individuals
seeking protection of individual rights after political power has been exercised in
legislative and or executive fora.
100 See, e.g., Brief for 55 Members of the United States Senate et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondent, D.C. v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 1, 6 (2008) (No. 07290), 2008 WL 383530, at *1, *6 (noting Congress' understanding that the Bill of
Rights guarantees fundamental, individual rights).
101 Although one could cite the Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson as evidence
that judicial tyranny could undermine fundamental rights as effectively as
legislative or executive majoritarian tyranny, state and federal judicial fora are
generally viewed as important to the rule of law for which the fundamental rights of
the weak, disadvantaged, or unpopular may receive legal redress against the
excesses of popular democratic will. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) overruled by Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 12, at 77-80. Hence, that
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Moreover, the parental interests that may limit the state's
actions become particularly weighty when the target of litigation
is directed toward the potential influence of the state upon
the innocent minds of children.
Despite this, the Court's
jurisprudence occasionally is rebuked as a thinly disguised
hostility toward religion.
In Santa Fe Independent School
District v. Doe,1°2 for example, the dissent argued that the
prevailing jurisprudence ostensibly bristles with hostility toward
religious expression in public life.'
The majority held that a
school policy permitting student-led and student-initiated prayer
at football games violates the Establishment Clause. 10 4 The
Court concluded that the football game prayers were not properly
characterized as private, but instead constituted public speech
authorized by a government policy and taking place on
government property at government-sponsored, school-related
events. 1 °5 The school's policy involved both perceived and actual
government endorsement of the delivery of prayer at important
°6
school events.
Those who disagree with the Court's conclusion in Santa Fe
occasionally argue that the case represents the Court's erroneous
approaches to the Establishment Clause when a moral matter
undergirds the government's action; the opposition, however, is
expressed in largely polemical terms.
Indeed, whether
morality1 0 7 does or should influence the content of legal rules is
one of the more significant debates in jurisprudence.'
In
courts occasionally may fail is no answer to the obligations of the rule of law in our

democratic system.
102 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
Id. at 318.
104Id. at 301.
105Id. at 302-03.
103

Id. at 305.
For some, by morality it is not meant that there are some a priori principles
that are true and axiomatic that do not require any human choices or that these
principles have value because they are "right" or "moral," and all we need do is find
them. In this context, morality is not self-evident; it is agreed to. In this sense,
whatever has value in our world now does not have value in itself, according to its
nature-nature is always valueless, but has been given value. Values come into
existence because of human choice. See, e.g., HART, supra note 98 (noting that the
development of law is influenced by morals).
10I Moral principles that underlie constitutional doctrine might be defined in
terms of the values held by some portion of individuals in a society. More to the
point, moral principles prevalent in a society generate obligations that individuals
should obey whether or not they are aware of the prevalent moral concepts or
objective principles and whether or not sanctions will follow from violating those
106
107
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reconciling majoritarianism and individual rights protected by
judicial review, courts rely upon first principles, or objective
principles that transcend majoritarian belief. These principles
exist whether or not they are endorsed by any individual or
group of individuals in "the fabric of the universe." 1°9
In rejecting the argument that morality alone is an
insufficient basis for enforcement of law, the Supreme Court, in
Bowers v. Hardwick,"' held that laws are "constantly based on
notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral
choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the
courts will be very busy indeed.""' In Lawrence v. Texas,1 2
however, the Court answered the Bowers Court by noting, "that
the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a
particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for
113 In other words,
upholding a law prohibiting the practice ...
Lawrence rejected morality as a singularly constitutionally sound
basis for law. During oral argument in Lawrence, Justice Scalia
made it clear that in his view, morality, without more, can justify
legislation. 14 Clearly, for some, the wisdom of religious tradition
may serve as a valid basis for legislating." 5 Even if religious
concepts. Still, the question whether the enforcement of morality is, itself, morally
justified cannot be answered simply by reference to the historical circumstance of
society regarding it as right to enforce an accepted view. See, e.g., id. at 17.
109 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 267 (1986). Scholars who seem to
express skepticism regarding objective principles may find little solace for. their
skepticism in the work reported by physicists and other scholars who have disclosed
compelling theories derived from the laws of physics concerning universals existing
in the fabric of the universe. These scholars contend that their work illuminates,
though not yet fully explains, principles upon which aspects of the ultimate
questions of physics and metaphysics depend for answers, including questions such
as "why we are here." See BRIAN GREENE, THE ELEGANT UNIVERSE: SUPERSTRINGS,
HIDDEN DIMENSIONS, AND THE QUEST FOR THE ULTIMATE THEORY 386-87 (2003).
110478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
111 Id. at 196.
112

539 U.S. 558 (2003).

H3 Id. at 577.
114 Id. at 589-90 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Yet, as explained more fully below, one

conspicuous difficulty with this view is its conceptual repugnance, namely, the
argument equates lack of religiosity with immorality.
115 In contradistinction to this view, some secularists argue that religion should
not be taken into account in the political sphere at all. FELDMAN, supra note 6
at 113, 129, 148. For example, for Feldman, the secularist movement "failed"notwithstanding that courts occasionally engage in a serious effort to resuscitate the
Establishment Clause's proscription that government must have a secular, rather
than religious, purpose-in conveying a message that would otherwise express
endorsement or disapproval of religion. See id.
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tradition should play a role in resolving debates concerning
government policy, the question remains-how so? Because all
religious traditions are not the same, to whose religious tradition
would we appeal?
The ongoing debate over Roe v. Wade 116 or, more recently,
Lawrence, and their constitutional vitality, also engulfs religious
expressions disguised as legal arguments. Although it would be
false to declare that majoritarian support for legal codes is
never-or is only rarely-influenced by views on morality, it
would be similarly misleading to ignore that what are asserted to
be objective principles reflected in law instead serve as
democratically determined majoritarian religious expressions
enacted in law.
Even if the assertion is correct that a widely held view of
morality is merely reflected in law, the question remains-why
should that sentiment be granted constitutional significance? A
law based upon a popular moral principle may nonetheless be
condemned as irrational if it operates in a manner contrary to
another equally compelling moral principle.1 17
Indeed majoritarian democracy is often confused with the
appealing belief that a democracy is governed by widely shared
values. This may be so, but American democracy also reflects the
importance of the rule of law, which allows a heterogeneous
society with various competing conceptions of good to remain
viable. In this respect, it may be that adherence to the rule of
law may well be indispensable for purposes of achieving
political cohesion with a minimum of oppression.118 Today, it is

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
The very notion of an ordered liberty seems infused with a moral criticism of
law regulating morality; namely, that the legal enforcement of morality is not
always morally correct. See HART, supra note 98, at 17-20. Similarly, in American
democracy, any legal test protecting a fundamental right must have some heft to
shoulder the fundamental interests through the mountain of attempts by the state
to regulate. Notably, in Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court failed to examine whether
the legal enforcement of majoritarian morality was legitimate, but in Lawrence v.
Texas, the Court, using a rational basis test with heft, considered and rejected the
argument that the State of Texas had a rational basis for its law implementing the
majority's belief that same-sex sodomy should be punishable by law. In so doing, the
Court, at least implicitly, accepted the notion that the legal coercion of majoritarian
morality was not morally justified.
M1Since the rights of individuals are protected in our constitutional democracy,
even "when popular morality is supported by an 'overwhelming majority,'" no one
should conclude that "loyalty to democratic principles requires him to admit that its
116
117
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incontrovertible, for example, that American-styled democracy
embraces a relationship between the rule of law and the right to
individual liberty and choice-participation, accountability, and
In America,
representation-in political decision-making. 119
rather than simply promoting naked populism, numerical
majorities yield to the rule of law when popular vote or
majoritarian political power otherwise would trammel individual
liberty. Though not without exception, courts must follow the
rule of law by protecting constitutional liberties, even when doing
so might frustrate majoritarian political power.1 2 ° Indeed, it is
fundamental to American-styled democracy that majority rule
occasionally must yield to anti-majoritarian constitutional
constraints to resolve the disparate demands arising from the
clashing of private interests when the legitimacy of fundamental
liberties is at stake.' 2 '
An interesting recent commentary on whether non-majority
interests should yield to majoritarian religious views or practices
is particularly worthy of note. Noah Feldman argues that
despite the "traditional manifestations of public symbolic"
majoritarian religious expression to "marginalize... minorities
like Jews and Catholics," it "matters more that" these traditions
have primarily protected "religious liberty without sacrificing the
aspiration of living together as a single nation."'22 In this regard,
imposition on a minority is justified." HART, supra note 98, at 81. Instead, even in a

democracy, "legal enforcement of morality calls for justification." Id. at 82.
119See BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY 5 (2004)
(linking "deliberative democracy" with policymaking as a form of democratic
process).
120 See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 511-12 (1947) (holding that the
state cannot finance parochial schools). More recent decisions, however, have upheld
certain indirect or incidental state aid to parochial schools. See, e.g., Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234-35 (1997) (public school teachers may impart remedial
education to disadvantaged parochial school students).
121 An example is aptly expressed: "[T]he democracy of legislative and executive
politics is overstated. The point does not require much development: the ways in
which representative democracy in practice diverges from the ideal are well-known.
The result then is an imperfectly anti-democratic judicial process and an imperfectly
democratic political process." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
309 (3d ed., Foundation Press 2000) (citation omitted).
122 FELDMAN, supra note 6, at 248-249. Feldman argues that the Church-state
problem should be resolved by allowing "public religion where it is inclusive, not
exclusive, and to allow religious displays and prayers so long as they accommodate
and honor religious diversity." As such, Feldman concludes, "[n]o one should ever be
coerced into religious exercise, but so long as no one's rights are violated, it makes
no sense to ban public religion on the theory that someone might be offended or feel
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the separation between Church and state evokes a principled
separation between government and organized religion, while
preserving public symbolic manifestations of faith.123
Since many Americans shape their political views by
religious values, it is argued, the Constitution's Establishment
Clause does not push religious expression into an entirely private
matter. 124 Adopting this view would seem to reject Newdow's
claim and allow the state to force students to participate in
majoritarian "symbolic" public religious practices regardless of
the age of the student. To some extent, Noah Feldman's view
echoes a similar view by others who argue that there are "so
many different religious denominations in the United States that
no one group would ever be able to impose its will over the
'
others."1 25
This view seems to be a degree optimistic and runs
contrary to the thrust of American history, which is replete with
attempts-some successful, some not-to imbue public life with
all manner of religious practice by those exercising majority

political power. 126
excluded." Id. at 15-16. As a conceptual matter, Feldman's goal seems laudable;
yet, it is not clear how his accommodation may be achieved-certainly not any more
so than the Church-state problem currently imposes. Feldman's proposal
accommodates the sense of exclusion that evangelicals necessarily experience under
secularism, but this accommodation is remarkably one-sided; it ignores those
who are not "religious" or who are aggressively secular. In addition, Feldman's
accommodation of "inclusive" religious expression seems to lack accommodation of
those who disagree with the symbols themselves or who disagree with the view that
public expression of religious symbols in a given circumstance actually honors
religious diversity. Id.
123 See MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF
LAW, 5 (2005) (Hamilton argues that because some religious conduct deserves
freedom and some requires limitation, "the right balance is achieved by subjecting
entities to the rule of law-unless they can prove that exempting them will cause no
harm to others").
124 During the time of the Constitution's framing, the framers likely adopted
moral principles that grew out of Protestant Christianity. FELDMAN, supra note 6, at
51.
12'Id. at 19.
12' Notwithstanding
that Christianity has its divergent doctrinal and
ecclesiastical strains, the United States is often referred to as a "Christian nation."
And, undoubtedly, in the United States, in drawing a comparison with Christianity,
the nation's religious diversity arises from numerically minority religions. Even so,
the world's major religions are well represented in America. Buddhism, for example,
"established 600 B.C., long before the Christian era," ranks fourth in number of
adherents in the United States and among the world's religions. See Cruz v. Beto,
405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972); WORLD ALMANAC 681-82 (2009); THE FACES OF BUDDHISM

IN AMERICA (Charles S. Prebish & Kenneth Kenichi Tanaka eds., 1998).
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Moreover, it is unclear which analytical tool is available to
separate symbolic religious expression in the public realm from
institutional religious expression. Indeed, a regime safeguarding
symbolic religious expression would seem to promote powerful
majoritarian messages in public life that merely reengages the
debate between separation of Church and state without resolving
it.
Feldman's proposal seems to fail primarily because of an
internal inconsistency and a reliance on an improbable
assumption. 127 The improbable assumption is that guarding
society against religious oppression by the state is sufficient to
ensure genuine religious diversity. The Founding Fathers knew
better: "It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard
the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one
part of the society against the injustice of the other part."128 In
other words, diversity in symbolic religious expression may guard
against legislative abuses of religious freedom, but the pernicious
harm springing from the majoritarian tyranny over the symbols
of religious expression in public life is not slightly or temporarily
ameliorated unless the state ensures that the rights of religious
minorities are secure from the pernicious impact of religious
exclusion. 129
For commentators who enter the Church-state debate by
adhering to the argument that majoritarian religious expression
does not harm minority religious views as long as those in the
majority hold for themselves what they impose on others, this
principle seems difficult to meet and conceals an important
aspect of American democracy-namely, that democracy is not
mere majority rule with the inevitable consequence that political
minorities are coerced and compelled to obey laws imposed
against their will. 3 ° Instead, American democracy requires
127

FELDMAN, supra note 6. With regard to the internal logic of Feldman's

proposal, his principle of accommodation-to accommodate the interests of those
whose political views are shaped by religious belief-runs counter to his accepted
principle that no one should be coerced into religious exercise.
128

ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON & JOHN JAY, THE FEDERALIST, ON

THE CONSTITUTION 241 (1857).
129There is nothing unique to the notion that majoritarian tyranny naturally

crowds out other voices. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 80-81 (Currin V. Shields
ed., Prentice-Hall 1956) (1859). For Mill, majoritarian tyranny could express its
might through race, religion, or class.
130The nation's history with minority religious conflicts, such as nineteenth
century government support of Catholic schools and the regulation of Mormon
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implementation of the general will through the efforts of
the entire citizenry, while acknowledging that fundamental
rights protect the development of the individual from the
tyranny of mass opinion.
Indeed, the very structure of
American democracy-through its separation of powers and
republicanism-aims to safeguard against the "common impulse
of passion" instigated and unleashed by "unjust majorities.""1
B.

The Integrationof ConstitutionalInterests

Like the Free Exercise Clause, the right of parental privacy
bolsters the weight of the parent's interest by injecting a
precisely framed interest for the matter at issue; notably,
children and parents are free from state intrusions or sanction
for expressing (or withholding expression of) their beliefs.
Religious freedom and parental privacy reflect two important
constitutional values, often tightly interwoven, that reinforce
prime goals of fundamental rights to protect the development of
the individual from the tyranny of mass opinion or the pernicious
social ostracism that results from unchecked majoritarian
democracy.
Indeed, unchecked majoritarian democracy
ultimately squelches individuality, independence, and free will,
all of which sustain the benefits that flow from the freedom
to be individual-not in the sense where individualism runs
in contrast to societal goals, but rather as society's real
13
counterpart. 1
polygamy practice exemplify the difficulty of drawing principled distinctions
between majority rules and non-establishment of religion. FELDMAN, supra note 6,
at 108-109 (arguing that the "historical power of nonsectarian conformity backed by
state coercion could hardly be more apparent" than it was in transforming the

religious views of Mormons from polygamy to strong adherents of the definition of
marriage as constituting only one man and one woman).
-3' See THE FEDERALIST PAPERS xxv-xxvi (Clinton Rossiter ed., Signet Classic
2003) (noting by way of introduction that the Federalists argued that separation of
powers and representative democracy serve the function of providing a degree of
protection against the tyrannical passionate excesses of numeric democratic power).
132 Some
scholars and commentators find it compelling to urge that the

Establishment Clause does not purport to protect individual rights in contrast with
the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, which does. Yet distinguishing the
Establishment Clause from the Free Exercise Clause by classification of what is or is
not a protection of an individual right has no ultimate relevance on what
government actions are restricted by either clause. Both clauses restrict government
power regardless of how a court may classify the clause, and what is at issue is
whether the clause reaches the government action targeted by the plaintiff. In this
regard, either clause could limit the government's action in a particular case
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Manifestationsof American Tradition

When courts begin urging an Establishment Clause doctrine
with a sense that the God penetrating the doctrine is a particular
God with a particular target of reference, the doctrine stresses a
point that seems at war with itself.13 3 Even so, it is historically
accurate to say that explicit American ceremonial governmentsponsored references to God were once supportable as references
to a Protestant god."' For those who worshiped other gods, no
god, or even the same god differently, God had no constitutional
context or target reference. 135
Yet, a zealous historicity to an interpretation of the
Establishment Clause obscures the unremarkable fact that the
meaning of religion as well as religious doctrine changes in
tandem with, and in response to, the changes in the culture of
both those who worship religion and those who are persecuted by
religion. 136 The fact that the Establishment Clause erects an
impasse blocking the righteous zeal of those who would embed a
compulsion in religion in the structure of government informs the
notwithstanding that the Establishment Clause may not be textually framed in the
Constitution as an apparent individual right.
133 See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 31 (James H.
Tully ed., Hackett Pubrg Co. 1983) (1689).
No private Person has any Right, in any manner, to Prejudice another
Person in his Civil Enjoyments, because he is of another Church or
Religion. All the Rights and Franchises that belong to him as a Man, or as
a Denison, are ....not the Business of Religion.

Id. That the influence of Locke's political works on the Founding Fathers is so widely
well documented, it bares simple observation.
134But see Jill Lepore, Prior Convictions: Did the Founders Want Us To Be
Faithful to Their Faith?,NEW YORKER, April 14, 2008, at 71, 73 (arguing that some
scholars make the claim that except for cherry-picking the statements of some of the
Founding Fathers, there is little support for the notion that the United States was
founded as a Christian nation; Benjamin Franklin, George Washington, John
Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison were not Christians or believers in
the divinity of Christ).
13-

See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 673 (1989) (Kennedy,

J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[1It borders on sophistry to suggest
that the 'reasonable' atheist would not feel less than a 'full membe[r] of the political
community' every time his fellow Americans recited, as part of their expression of
patriotism and love for country, a phrase he believed to be false." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
136 This is so notwithstanding the debate on how to interpret the Constitution.
See HAMILTON, supra note 123, at 111 ("[Tlhe early public schools started with
indoctrination in a Protestant perspective."). Far from tradition, the early practice of
American public schools seems illustrative of the controversy and fight for political
power over nascent public education systems.
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careful manner in which Courts must reject unreflective
13 7

approbation for linking national identity with religion.
Those who recoil from a Christian-centric view of the
Establishment Clause argue instead for an interpretation that
focuses upon the establishment of religion (or a religion). Having
no particular targeted religion in mind, however, provides no
guidance in the ways religious people view religion and, hence,
offers a rather effete guidepost.
For instance, in his dissent in Lawrence, Justice Scalia
would cabin off state laws against same-sex sodomy as
sustainable under rational basis review. 3 ' For Scalia, the law is
often derivative of notions of morality.
Implicitly, Scalia's
argument does not turn on the interpretation of constitutional
text, history, or structure; instead, his focus is upon a doctrine of
morality and its role in either shaping law or being shaped by
law. "3' 9 Without saying so explicitly in Lawrence, Scalia switches
from a concern as to what the Constitution means to conceptual
arguments framing what concerns the Justice as a matter of
Christian morality. This conceptual switching is apparent in
cases in which the reasoning of the Court's majority raises
concerns of Christian morality. 140 In such cases, the Court's
holding obfuscates the principle for which it stands; ironically,
the Court's opinions rest on a consideration of the intersection
between a supernatural entity and moral judgment in law.
Given that the task of the Court in such cases is to ensure that
the state not weigh in favor of those whose belief in a particular
supernatural entity results in the legal enforcement of ethical
imperatives of the given supernatural being, the Court's
doctrinal foundation for conceptual switching from what the

137 The American "tradition" is filled with all sorts of paradoxes; during the
framing of the Constitution, church attendance was low, most Americans were
Protestant, Thomas Jefferson rejected the idea of a "personal God," and
Thanksgiving was both supported and opposed because it was viewed as a statesponsored religious exercise. See, FELDMAN, supra note 6, at 51-53.
138 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558, 599 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
139 In this case, morality may be confused with taboo. Inducing an individual to
abstain from a behavior because of an attached conventional value is often the
province of taboo, not morality. See HART, supra note 98, at 57.
140 See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 100-03 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).

20091

PLEDGING TO GOD

Constitution means to what it means to apply the Constitution to
Christian morality is hopelessly frustrating.'
This is not to say that the application of Christian morality
to constitutional interpretation is always a cover for Christian
liturgy-or even conservative ideology. The Court's faithful
approach to interpreting the Constitution by resort to the
original meaning of the text in such cases is not worthy of doubt.
Often, however, rather than assess the controversy before it by
acknowledging the nation's religious heritage, the Court invokes
142
the doctrinal underpinnings of a specific religious heritage.
Even if the appeal of connecting religious morality with law
springs from a conviction that the "history of man is inseparable
from the history of religion," 43 this is not to say that First
Amendment jurisprudence should abandon the long-standing
principle that the Establishment Clause "rest[s] on the belief
that a union of government and religion tends to destroy
government and to degrade religion. 1 44 Nor is the connection
between religious morality and law sustained by applying
1 45
originalism to constitutional decision-making.
To the extent that the Court might be viewed as faithfully
endorsing
an original
meaning doctrinal position
of
Constitutional interpretation, the Court has not yet addressed
why an originalist analysis, anchored in past meanings, does
not, itself, ill-serve the purported agenda of originalistskeeping courts from legislating private preferences through
141 Indeed,
the application of a Judeo-Christian-centric view to the
Constitution's Establishment Clause ultimately begs the question of what a
separation of Church from state may mean since religion is not in any sense
separate from state in the traditional doctrine of Judaism or Christianity. See, e.g.,
RICHARD ELLIOT FRIEDMAN, WHO WROTE THE BIBLE 46 (1987) (noting that early
Judaism was so connected to the affairs of the state that the harbinger of Judaism
was ostensibly a transnational religion).
142 For example, Justice Scalia, the Court's most consistent adherent of
constitutional interpretation through the lens of originalism, is viewed as guided, in
part, by his "traditional Catholic education." ROSEN, supra note 12, at 190.
143 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 434 (1962). In Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306
(1952) the Court specifically recognized that "[w]e are a religious people whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." Id. at 313.
144 Engel, 370 U.S. at 431. Similarly, Thomas Jefferson argued that the
Constitution's First Amendment banned any state action that in any way interfered
with or engaged in religious practice or exercise. See FELDMAN, supra note 6, at 53.
14- At bottom, theories of constitutional interpretation or construction raise two
concerns; namely, whether we are "debating the meaning of the text, or how this
meaning should be put into effect[.I" BARNETT, supra note 62, at 357.
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Constitutional adjudication.

This is not to say that judicial

deference to democratic outcomes never should guide
constitutional interpretation; rather, the questions are whether
14 6
originalism, ultimately, is successful in achieving its purpose
and whether the Constitution is well supported by judicial
decision-making constrained by an interpretive philosophy that
anchors the meaning of the Constitution to bygone textual
meanings. 47
Notwithstanding the assumptions made by
14 There is considerable scholarship challenging the argument that a preferred
method of interpreting the Constitution is by resort to determining the original
intent of the Founding Fathers. Many adherents have abandoned this version of
"originalism." In its place, originalism is framed as a method of interpreting the

Constitution by excavating the text's original meaning. See Antonin Scalia,
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 854 (1989); see also Randy
E. Barnett, Was the Right To Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on Service in
an Organized Militia?, 83 TEx. L. REV. 237, 240 (2004) (book review) ("Those
originalists who favor original intent want to fill the gaps in the original public
meaning and cabin the discretion of those engaged in construction of abstract
provisions by appealing to the specific intentions of those who either wrote or
ratified them."). Although the move from original intent to original meaning
avoids some of the obvious frailties generally associated with matters of intent, it is
difficult to view original meaning as a vastly improved theory of constitutional
interpretation. Indeed, original meaning may be derivative of original intent, rather
than favorably distinct from it. The move by originalists from original intent to
original textual meaning is an illusory move because originalism, in either form,
cannot escape the basic assumption that textual meaning is intimately tied to a
process whereby expressions, words, and phrases are understood as references
delivered by drafters or speakers for a particular purpose. Like original intent,
original meaning is anchored to context. Whether clues as to the answers of textual
meaning spring from assumptions about the intentions of the drafters of a text or
from the context of the text, disputes over meaning may require those searching for
meaning to go beyond the text in as many cases as any interpretative theory would;
hence, reducing the clumsy view that originalism as a method provides a greater
restraint on judges who might otherwise more systematically go beyond text
(for example, appeal to moral principles, democratic values, precedent, or the
Constitution's structure) to divine the Constitution's meaning.
147 See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 62, at 96. Barnett prefers a version of
originalism-identified as original public meaning-that ostensibly has two steps of
analysis: (1) discerning the original public meaning of the text of the Constitution by
examination of linguistic usage; and (2) with the results of the first step in hand,
an application of the meaning to the facts of the case. Once the "original public
meaning of the text" is interpreted, the interpretation "must be applied to the facts
of particular cases"; in Barnett's originalism, the act of applying interpreted
meaning to cases "is better described as constitutional construction, rather than as
interpretation of text." Barnett, supra note 146, at 240. Because original public
meaning anchors constitutional interpretation to the Constitution's text, as an
interpretative method, it may be superior to original intent, which allows the search
for constitutional meaning to go far beyond the Constitution's text. In this respect,
originalism, as an interpretative method, binds courts in some objective way in the
search for meaning or when discerning what the law is; but, step two of Barnett's
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originalists, it may well be perverse to expect the inevitably
innovatory relations of human affairs to be hamstrung by a rigid
and unflinching constitutional law.14 Indeed, originalist analysis
linked to historical meanings may just as likely lead to so-called
activist judicial decision-making as is true of other theories of
constitutional interpretation.1 4 9
As the vicissitudes of legal
opinions among originalists demonstrate, history is no objective
originalism seems to remove the objective shackles imposed by step one by
permitting courts to engage in what may be a highly arbitrary construct in actual
practice. Constitutional construction takes the interpreter outside the text of the
Constitution. In this manner, interpretative construction seems no less open-ended
than viewing the Constitution as a living document for which the Court may breathe
new meaning into it at its discretion. Indeed, the need to "construct" the
Constitution's meaning rather than, or in addition to, interpreting it, is likely to
be a common phenomenon under Barnett's originalism. Notably, constitutional
interpretation largely rests on disputes over how to apply what we say the
Constitution means to facts never imagined by "the People" or those who wrote and
ratified the Constitution's text. Hence, whether the First Amendment, for example,
protects the right to download digital bits significantly will depend on a court's
application of step two of Barnett's version of originalism. Step one will not offer
much to the analysis. Moreover, it is not at all incontrovertible that a text as
abstract as the United States Constitution will rarely have a singular original
meaning. Indeed, the very instance of litigation over a phrase or word in the
Constitution is likely to demonstrate the flawed presupposition in the method of
original public meaning; the method seems to confuse the role of the court in
deciding what the law is, with the court's method of deciding what the law is. That a
court, when appropriate, will determine what the Constitution means (that is, the
court will pick a meaning when meaning is in dispute), does not denote, ipso facto,
that a court has established the "singular" public meaning of the text. A textual
interpretation that hinges on a linguistic assessment of textual usage does not
necessarily embrace the conclusion that the text has a singularoriginal meaning, no
matter how emphatically the court expresses its conclusion. Abstract language is
inherently vague, imbued with multiple meanings and various shades of meaning.
Still, original public meaning has a great deal of appeal as an interpretative method
that, when used cautiously and faithfully, may yield textually consistent meaning
that changes only by following a formal method of amendment.
148 Of course, originalists often persist that originalism reminds courts that they
have no authority to inject the judiciary into every matter of human activity and, as
such, originalism acts as a beacon of democracy by staying the hands of otherwise
activist judges who are unaccountable and anti-democratic. But, it is far from clear
whether originalism is as principled as its adherents assert. Some critics of
originalism urge that originalism is in drag: a set of hard-core political attitudes
and traditions, self-styled and dressed up as a legal theory of constitutional
interpretation. Compare Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[T]he Equal Protection Clause... requires the
democratic majority to accept for themselves and their loved ones what they impose
on you and me."), with Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 641 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit a democratic
majority from singling out gays for disfavored treatment).
141All heuristic tools of textual analysis are interpretive.
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limitation on the judicial discretion of courts.' 50 In addition,
original meaning proponents have not provided persuasive
arguments for why limits on government power to intrude upon
fundamental rights must weaken in the arms of history and
tradition.' 5 ' And, for originalists, the arms of history and
tradition are strong indeed, squeezing broad limits on judicial
discretion to stay the hand of congressional intrusion upon the
body of fundamental rights.
In cases where majoritarian support for legal codes is
influenced by views on morality (or, more likely, constituting
religious expression), originalists have consented to locating the
right of privacy as "penumbral to the specific guarantees in the
Bill of Rights."'5 2 They urge, however, that privacy is not a
fundamental right. Instead, originalists view privacy as an
interest that can be invaded by the state if the state has a
legitimate interest and a rational reason for the invasion. Of
course, as a fundamental interest, privacy would be ostensibly
nugatory under originalism because it follows a fortiori that,
given the nation's tradition of permitting states to regulate
majoritarian views of morality (and, more obliquely, popular
religious views), such laws, when challenged by a minority
viewpoint, will be deemed legitimate and pass rational basis
scrutiny.
Interestingly, Justice Scalia has explicitly recognized this
conundrum for originalists in contexts where originalists hold
less affinity for state invasions of privacy. In Lawrence, Scalia
urged that the right of privacy found no support "deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition," or that the right of privacy
can be legitimately restricted based on our "longstanding history
150 See Lepore, supra note 134, at 73. Originalism sends us to the Founding

Fathers after the Constitution's text proves too vague to inform, but with regard to
the Constitution's Religion Clauses, it may be "impossible to discover precisely what

the Founders believed about God, Jesus, sin, the Bible, churches, and Hell. They
changed their minds and gave different accounts to different people." Id.
151 Indeed, one view of originalism is that it may be used to cut short the reach
of history and tradition when such is incompatible with the views of those carrying
out the will of the present-day majority. See ROSEN, supra note 12, at 192-93
("Scalia defended his judicial philosophy of [originalism] ... as a way of ensuring
that democratic majorities can enact their will into law."); see also Lepore, supra
note 134, at 74 (urging that an interpretative theory of the Constitution that begins
and ends with the Founding Fathers may suffer from compressing eighteenthcentury American life into the views of a handful of men).
152 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 595 (2003).
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of laws" influenced by majoritarian views regulating consensual
sexual conduct in the home. 5 3 But in Kyllo v. United States, 5 4 he
urged that privacy expectations are longstanding and deeprooted when an individual is in his home. 155 Though the right of
privacy asserted in Kyllo emanated from the Fourth Amendment
rather than a "right penumbral. . . in the Bill of Rights,"15 6 Scalia
offered that, in this context, the right of privacy had "roots deep
in the common law."15 7 Speaking for the Court, Scalia explained
that the right of privacy protects the home and any information
found in the home; in his words, "[i]n the home, our cases show,
all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held
safe from prying government eyes. "1581nti
In this regard, what was
at issue in Kyllo was not whether a fundamental right of privacy
existed to protect those in the home-it did, and the Court said
so. At issue was whether the government actually had invaded
the home.
Notably,
Justice
Scalia was
concerned with
the
constitutional traditions of protecting privacy in Kyllo, despite
the fact that no stretch of the original meaning of any of the
words of the Fourth Amendment to legitimately reach a search or
seizure conducted from a helicopter or a thermal imaging device.
It is quite astonishing to find an originalist in Kyllo, urging that
the Court must "assure[] preservation of that degree of privacy
against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment
was adopted."15' 9 Indeed, Scalia found the modern technology
...
Id. at 596-97 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
154533 U.S. 27 (2001). In Kyllo, the Court held that the use of a thermal imaging
device aimed at a private home from a public street to detect relative amounts of
heat within the home constitutes a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 28.
155 Id. In this regard, the Kyollo Court determined that thermal image
monitoring of the home to detect invisible thermal radiation as it passes through the
walls of a house, strips us of our most basic boundary of personal privacy by
electronically gathering invisible information coming from the interior of the home.
The state violates the right of privacy in substantially the same way as occurred
through the use of electronic monitoring in United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705,
715-716 (1984), and in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) superseded by
statute, Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82
Stat. 197, as recognized in United States v. Koyomejian, 946 F.2d 1450, 1455 (9th
Cir. 1991).
"6 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 595.
157 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 28.
15 Id. at 37.
"' Id. at 28.
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particularly invasive of interests known to be important in 1791,
noting that despite the dissent's view to the contrary, a "thermal
imager reveals the relative heat of various rooms in the home,"
and, as such, the heat constitutes the type of information desired
to be protected from unwarranted access by the government by
those who voted to adopt the Fourth Amendment in 1791.
Of course, Scalia could not have meant what he was saying.
Instead Scalia was acknowledging-what might be difficult for
an originalist-that our fundamental rights would exist only
frozen in time, with no relevance in modern life, if the scope of
fundamental rights could be assessed only by what was known
two-hundred years ago. 16
What is more telling is that an
originalist could make the concession-albeit obliquely-in Kyllo,
but not in Lawrence.161
D.

Concealment, Solitude, and Non-Public Zones

Conceptually, privacy is confined in two important
respects. 162 First, the scope of privacy is restricted to protections
for control (or the degree of control) over the disclosure of
information that would provide intimate access to self. Secondly,
the scope is restricted to protections against the unwanted
disclosure of information that would result in an invasion of
subjectively protected space, including both physical matters
and those conceptual matters that draw meaning from
authentic communion. The former protects our value for selfdetermination, while the latter protects our value for real and
perceived zones of intimacy. Taken together, these interests
reinforce values of independence and free will that form the
160 Even for the originalist, the "Constitution sometimes governs through openended standards rather than tightly written rules." John 0. McGinnis, Bookshelf. A
Justice is Weighed in the Balance, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2006, at D8. This is so,
because "determining the substantial needs of government can be quite a subjective
exercise." Id.
161 In Lawrence v. Texas, police officers in Houston, Texas, responded to a
private report of a weapons disturbance in a private residence. They entered the
residence owned by John Geddes Lawrence. On entering, they did not see any
weapons. But they did see Lawrence engaging in a sexual act with Tyron Garner.
Lawrence and Garner were arrested, held in custody, and convicted of the crime of
"deviate sexual intercourse, namely anal sex, with a member of the same sex (man)."
539 U.S. at 562-63 (internal quotation marks omitted).
162 As developed more fully below, the unifying construct advanced here centers
on conceiving of the right of privacy as protecting primarily liberty-based interests.
See infra text accompanying notes 164-79.
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essence of our conception of privacy. 16 3 Private issues not coming
within this framework probably identify values other than those
traditionally conceived of as supporting a right of privacy.
Secrecy is an illusory counterpart of privacy. Both secrecy
and privacy are regarded as matters involving concealment,
solitude, and non-public zones of disclosure. Yet, conceptually,
privacy neither requires concealment nor encompasses that
which is not shared with others. American privacy, in its
broadest sense, expresses a societal view that individuals should
be protected against unauthorized interference by government,
media, and others with respect to certain matters hinging on
independence and free will.
The relationship between individual liberty and government
control is, at least, conspicuously informative of the nature of free
will and individual independence."
The yoke of public opinion
throughout American history-whether empowered by private
individuals acting through collective conformity or the power
of the state-has demonstrated that there is social value
in restraining social convention from oppressing individual
development. 65 Ironic perhaps, but the evidence of oppressive
social convention is replete throughout the historical records of
American public education. Consequently, privacy interests are
paramount in public school education where the power and
influence of the state upon children is considerable, and, once
absorbed, the impact of the state's influence is not easy to
dislodge.66
163 Defining "free will" is a sufficiently ambitious undertaking. John Stuart
Mill's view of "human liberty" captures the essential qualities. Free will comprises
the (1) inward domain of the liberty of human thought and feeling and the outward
domain of expression, (2) the liberty to pursue life to suit one's own character, and
(3) the liberty of the individual to form collectives. MILL, supra note 129, at 16.
Perhaps a simpler way to refer to free will is to view a will that is free as one that is
willing and able to make morally responsible decisions, notwithstanding that the
will may be influenced by external agents such as culture, language, or persuasion.
See, e.g., Luke Pollard & Rebecca Massey-Chase, An Argument About Free Will:
DialogueAbout Freedom and Determinism, PHIL. NOW, Mar./Apr. 2008, at 28, 29.
MA See MILL, supra note 129 (Mill's classic statement on individual liberty urges
for restrictions against both government control and social conventions that limit
the individual from developing in his or her own way).
.6 Public opinion can express a powerfully restraining influence against
individual development by accusing the individual of either doing "what nobody
does" or of not doing "what everybody does." Id. at 83.
'6' See, e.g., Medeiros v. Kiyosaki, 478 P.2d 314, 316-17 (Haw. 1970) (upholding
non-compulsory reproductive education film series for children, finding parental
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E.

Protectionof Free Will
Notwithstanding American tradition, a clearly expressed
conception of liberty within the explicit text of the Federal
Constitution is challenging to denominate.
The challenge,
however, does not serve as a basis to negate the conception of
privacy as an interest supporting free will. 16 7 There is no doubt,
for example, that the right of privacy is largely grounded in a
long-standing acknowledgement that privacy is conceptually an
essential coordinate branch of autonomy and liberty. This right
calls forth legal interests that protect the individual from
oppression and harmful unauthorized disclosures of matters or
facts that are valued because of their interconnection between an
individual and his subjective self. 68 Fundamentally, privacy
supports the interests protecting control over the development of
one's mental and moral nature, unconstrained from the yoke of
public opinion.
This includes those interests privileged by
imposing restraints against the state's intrusion into individual
liberty, except for those matters where the collective authority of
society and/or the state are necessary to protect society. 169
privacy right remains intact); Care and Protection of Charles, 504 N.E.2d 592,
598-600 (Mass. 1987) (upholding statute requiring town intervention for care and
protection of home-schooled children); Custody of Two Minors, 487 N.E.2d 1358,
1365 (Mass. 1986) (noting removal of child from parental home implicates, not
violates, fundamental interest to raise children).
167 Without more, "personal autonomy" and control over "self-disclosure" are no
longer assumed valid interests by a growing number of skeptical commentators.
Although it is difficult to conceptualize personal autonomy as anything but a moral
good, some commentators have noted that autonomy stems from power relations and
is too dependent on the exaltation of the individual over the social order or collective.
Yet, it cannot be denied that the exercise of personal autonomy is a feature of
American life as it is in any progressive society. Personal autonomy allows one to
identify and exercise individual choice. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 89 (1980) (citing HANNAH ARENDT, ON
REVOLUTION 147 (1963)).
16 Of course, freedom of expression and the right of privacy may clash as
competing constitutional interests as well. See, e.g., Millstone v. O'Hanlon Reports,
Inc., 528 F.2d 829, 833 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that consumer credit reports merit
relaxed First Amendment protection because they constitute commercial speech);
Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 486 F.2d 25, 29-30 (5th Cir. 1973) (noting that
private subscription credit report "coincides with the doctrine of commercial speech"
mainly because it "was distributed... for commercial purposes and clearly without
regard to social concerns or grievances"); Grove v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 438 F.2d
433, 438 (3d Cir. 1970) (holding that credit reports are not entitled to the extended
constitutional protections under the First Amendment's freedom of expression).
169 As Mill informs, though, the struggle between liberty and the state often has
been the most conspicuous struggle when issues involve liberty. The struggle
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As noted above, laden within the value of protecting privacy
are interests in protecting the individual from unwarranted
intrusions into private spheres of his life and existence, whether
within or outside the home. Because privacy does not equate
with solitude, it is difficult to gauge the degree of public or open
coverage that may accommodate an activity. Certainly, private
and public modes follow interdependent and co-evolutionary
Marriage,' 7" for
paths in any valid conception of privacy.
example, has both public and private modes, neither of which
eliminates the fact that married couples enjoy privacy protections
despite the open nature of a legally sanctioned marriage. Indeed,
what places marriage within the womb of protection of the right
of privacy is not a legal fiction concerning the secret nature of
marriage-for marriage is rarely viewed as an object of secrecy or
solitude." 1 Instead, marriage falls fittingly within the scope of
privacy because civil marriages are deeply personal, intimate
relationships within which the participants often freely disclose
aspects of self that remain outside the eyes of the viewing public,
despite the recognition that marriages constitute relationships
that are important to society as well as individuals.'7 2 "It is an
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in
living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or
social projects.' 7 3 The civil aspect of marriage in American
between the cultivation of the individual and the tyranny of public opinion is a
similarly "highly dangerous" threat to liberty. MILL, supra note 129, at 1-2. For Mill,
there is a zone of human dignity and a vector of private belief with which the state
has no legitimate interest traversing. See DAVID COHEN, LAW, SEXUALITY, AND
SOCIETY: THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 2-3 (1991).
170 At least, what is meant by reference to the "right to marry" has been accepted
to be a fundamental right that is protected against unwarranted state interference.
See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) ("[Tlhe right to marry is of
fundamental importance for all individuals."); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967) (stating that freedom to marry is "one of the vital personal rights essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men" under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (finding
that marriage is one of the "basic civil rights of man"); see also Turner v. Safley, 482
U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987) (holding that a prisoner's right to marry is constitutionally
protected).
171 See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384.
172 It may be an accident of American history that the private aspect of marriage
did not engulf the practice sufficiently to render it a basic liberty of contract or a
"simple act of consent." Feldman, supra note 6, at 103 (noting that if the Puritans
had their way, legal theories supporting the regulation of marriage in the United
States, at least, would have less to do with rank religiosity disguised as tradition).
113 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
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culture may also reinforce a fundamental value that the decision
whether and to whom to marry is among life's meaningful acts of
self-definition with which the government is forbidden to
174
interfere with by erecting barriers of invidious discrimination.
As noted earlier, privacy, like liberty, presumes a freedom of
will that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and
certain intimate conduct.17
It is in this regard that privacy
erects a barrier setting limits of society over the individual.1 76
The Supreme Court has identified at least two significant
formulations supporting this conception of privacy interests: the

Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and
seizure and the Fourteenth Amendment protection against
unwarranted intrusions upon liberty. 177 As recently as Lawrence,
the Supreme Court reasserted that an important constitutional
protection of privacy emanates from the exercise of liberty as
understood under the Court's reading of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 178
174 But see ROSEN, supra note 12, at 130 (noting the apparent skepticism that
should accompany the notion that Griswold is properly viewed as a "paean to the
sanctity of marriage").
175 Of course, some theorists doubt the moral good of personal autonomy or
private life. See, e.g., Robin L. West, ConstitutionalSkepticism, 72 B.U. L. REV. 765,
774 (1992) (noting that personal autonomy may serve the ends of private hierarchies
of power); cf. Richard A. Posner, The Moral Minority, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1999,
§ 7, at 14 (reviewing GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, ONE NATION, Two CULTURES (2001))
("Unless we want to go the way of Iran, we shall not be able to return to the era of
premarital chastity, low divorce, stay-at-home moms, pornography-free media and
the closeting of homosexuals and adulterers.").
178Privacy should be an ends in itself. Often, however, the conception of privacy
is either confused with closely resembling interests or is inappropriately defined
by its relationship to other interests and meanings. For example, interests in
solitude, secrecy, and individuality are confusingly balanced against openness,
public exposure, and societal values instead of conceiving of privacy on its own
regard.
177 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847-48 (1992)
(stating that "there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not
enter"); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(arguing that the Fourth Amendment is violated when an expectation of privacy is
invaded and it is one that society is willing to recognize as reasonable).
17' Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562-63 (2003) (stating that there are
spheres in our existence where the state should not be present). Going a step
further, Randy Barnett has urged that the Supreme Court currently appears to be
on a course of entirely redefining the right of privacy as a right of liberty. See Randy
E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's LibertarianRevolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 2002-2003
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21, 21. Barnett notes that if the theory of "privacy" set forth in
Lawrence is taken seriously by the Court in future cases, it may represent "nothing
short of a constitutional revolution." Id. Pushing the point further, Barnett notes
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Protectionof Individual Independence

In addition to the constitutional conceptions sustaining the
protection of privacy, the common law has found privacy
interests rooted in first principles concerning the value of human
179
dignity and the desire for control of self-disclosure.
Sensationalist journalism, fed by our implacable appetite for
rumors, gossip, and scandal, has yielded a robust common law
privacy jurisprudence. This common law represents the idea
that knowledge of others inevitably leads to knowledge of self.
Moreover, the common law recognizes, that this knowledge of self
becomes the object of personal regard and non-disclosure. In
other words, unwanted gossip is often the target of contemporary
18 0
protections of common law privacy.
Few, if any, would deny that upon meeting a stranger, the
acknowledgement by the stranger, "I have heard so much about
you," beckons a response as to what had been heard. This
natural sentiment seems to follow from the contradiction

that in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy puts "rhetorical distance" between the right of
privacy protected in Griswold and the liberty right protected by Lawrence. Id. at 34.
He supports this conclusion by noting that Justice Kennedy only once used the
words "right of privacy" (apart from quotations from the grant of certiorari from a
previous case discussing Griswold) in his majority opinion, but in contrast, Justice
Kennedy used the word "liberty" "at least twenty-five times." See id. Certainly, that
the Lawrence court describes petitioners' conduct as "an exercise of their liberty,"
suggests that in some liberty cases, the Court may urge that the government must
justify its statutory restriction, rather than requiring the citizen to establish that
the liberty being exercised is somehow "fundamental." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564;
see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989). In this manner, once an
action is deemed to be a proper exercise of liberty (as opposed to license), the burden
shifts to the government. This is significant, in part, in Barnett's view, because
"[n]either the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of States at the time of the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer limits of the substantive
sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects." See Barnett, supra, at
33. Barnett's analysis seems fair, if not completely persuasive. Even those who
maintain a degree of intellectual unease with Justice Kennedy's newly established
connection between privacy and liberty in Lawrence, may find comfort knowing
that Griswold's emanations, penumbras, and zones of privacy are philosophically
connected to a liberty-centered view of the Constitution; a view that sees natural law
as persuasive as enumerated rights as a basis for constitutional adjudication. See,
e.g., ROSEN, supra note 12, at 131 (echoing the sentiment that there are roots of
natural law Lochnerism in Griswold). At any rate, the argument urged is that the
Court is reestablishing a broken connection between privacy and liberty, rather than
attempting a wholesale invention.
"' See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L.
Rev. 193, 196 (1890).
180 Id.
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between our appetite for information about others and our desire
to control disclosures of self.
Privacy performs both an individual function as well as a
social function: free society is enhanced through the personal
development of its individual members whose personal growth is
fostered through the freedom of self-evaluation that blossoms
under the protections of control of self-disclosure. Hence, privacy
1 ' essential
promotes the "vital diversity of speech and behavior""
1 82
to a healthy democracy.
To be sure, the protection of privacy
encompasses two interests. It grants individual autonomy over
disclosure of self and mitigates the harmful effects caused by
unauthorized surveillance. Consequently, the protection against
disclosure by others is laden with similar values-albeit differing
legal interests-supporting the protection against state invasions
18 3
of privacy.
Too often, it seems courts proceed in analyzing privacy
questions as if the pivotal issue before them requires a
consideration of when the law should prohibit the disclosure of a
person's private information by a government or private actor.
This question begs for a certain class of answers that frequently
disfavor imposing limits upon disclosure. Samuel Warren and
Louis Brandeis" 4 argued that the pertinent question for privacy
is whether the "sacred precincts of private and domestic life"
ought to be sealed from unauthorized invasion. 8 5 For Warren

181Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as
Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1425 (2000).
182 See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798) (recognizing that an act of the

legislature contrary to the great first principles of the social compact cannot be
considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority merely because the majority
has spoken).
183 See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy,
and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1161-62 (2002) (noting privacy
exemptions in many state and federal freedom of information acts); Jerry Kang,
Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions,50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1230 n.157
(1998) (stating that in determining the constitutionality of state recordkeeping
statutes the courts must balance the harm to individuals against the societal
benefit).
184 See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 383 (1960) (noting that
Warren and Brandeis' law review article is one of the most influential legal
periodicals in American law).
185 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 179, at 195. Apparently, what became a
seminal law review piece on the normative impulse for judicial enforcement of
common law privacy interests was co-authored when Samuel Warren was affronted
by a story published about his family's private life by an obsessive and ruthless
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and Brandeis, privacy was protectible to keep the boundaries "of
propriety and of decency" from being exceeded. 8 It is a priori
that the protection against disclosure, not the promotion of
8 7
disclosure, is the aim of privacy.1
In simple formulation, Warren and Brandeis conceived of
privacy as a protection arising from a liberty interest that
safeguards an individual's inviolate personality. For Warren and
Brandeis, privacy is rooted in the protection of an individual's
thoughts, emotions, and sensations expressed in writing or in
conduct.'8 8 As such, privacy denotes a right protecting expression
that, once disclosed, necessarily creates an injury to the honor
and dignity of the individual. In other words, the facts relating
to one's private life that one has seen fit to keep private should
not be disclosed without an individual's authorization.
Notwithstanding that there are common roots in the
principles underlying the right of privacy, courts have not shown
89
serious inclination to systematically assess the law for privacy.
In fact, courts have a tendency to express confusion or doubt
about the basis for the law of privacy rather than harmonize or
make sense of the case law.' 90 Courts rarely conceive of privacy
as a unifying principle because of doubts about the normative
appropriateness of doing so.'9 1 Indeed, it is true enough that a
court is likely to fail in its attempt to derive a core value for
privacy by searching positive law. For some time now, the
protection of the right of privacy has been accomplished through

press. See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundationsof Privacy: Community and Self in
the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 976 (1989).
1"6 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 179, at 196; see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS

§

652D (1977).

There are important interests supported by deterring clandestine invasions
of privacy and preventing the involuntary broadcast of private communications.
Warren and Brandeis recognized that "[tihe intensity and complexity of life,
attendant upon advancing civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from
the world, and man, under the refining influence of culture, has become more
sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become more essential to the
individual." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 179, at 196.
187

18 See id. at 195.

189 To be sure, there is no such thing as a systematic conception of "privacy law."
The doctrinal basis to the law of privacy springs from amorphous roots that, thus
far, have been unyielding to simple analysis.
190See Jeff Kosseff, Note, The Elusive Value: Protecting Privacy During Class

Action Discovery, 97 GEO. L.J. 289, 313 (2008).
191 See

Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REV. 737, 749 (1989).
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a patchwork of laws and regulation.'9 2 This depth and breadth of
privacy law exceeds the practical necessity of providing a court
seeking to resolve the matter before it with guidance on a
93
conceptual account of privacy. 1
Particularly with regard to federal constitutional questions,
distinctions among differing protections of privacy are sometimes
bolstered by reference to cases that conflate into one matter what
are actually two distinct issues. Those cases confuse whether
privacy should be protected in a given circumstance with
whether it has already been protected as such. 9 4 Often, when
courts are addressing the latter matter, privacy is relegated to an
issue about the meaning of privacy' 95 and its use in a specific
context. But when, more appropriately, the former is addressed,
a court will examine what is being protected and why.
Though courts often have not treated the matter as such, the
question, what should be protected by privacy, is analytically
distinct from whether privacy has protected a given area or
subject matter. The latter question, dealing primarily with
precedent and tradition, is likely to result in conclusory answers
aimed at rejecting the arguments favoring privacy-especially
when a court poses an answer to the latter question as if it were
directly addressing the former question. 196
Under the rubric of the right of privacy, the Court, for
example, has discretely acknowledged a right to abortion,
contraception, marriage, and rearing of children.'9 7 This grocery
192Kosseff, supra note 190.
193 See id.

194 Of course, this type of confusion is reminiscent of the courts' confusion over

the meaning of liberty as a right of substantive due process, notwithstanding that
the concept of liberty is fundamental to American notions of freedom, individuality,
and the democratic process.
195 Too often, courts follow an analysis that ultimately requires the court to
resuscitate a weakened conception of privacy after the court has nearly killed it
through prior analysis.
196 Traditions are important, but only a rare tradition should override the
fundamentally American tradition that past practices-merely because they are past
practices-shall not become excuses to isolate or devalue groups who cannot exercise
majoritarian political power. History and tradition must be given sufficiently broad
girth to allow a court's reach to grasp protected interests that once were viewed as
unprotected without turning the court's grasp into limitless judicial discretion or
unbounded judicial fiat.
197 See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (recognizing a
parent's right to send a child to private school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
402-03 (1923) (recognizing a parent's right to give a child instruction in a foreign
language); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992)
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list approach to privacy has the effect of reducing and diffusing
the rhetorical force of the right to a highly discretionary interest
of individuals or a weak impediment to countervailing interests
of government, which courts across the country too often uphold
or reject at will.
Answers to the questions what is it that individuals find
worthy of protecting in the sphere of privacy-however we agree to
define the concept-and how best can policymakers give that desire
sufficiently clear articulation to allow courts to vindicate privacy
interests when appropriate, are worth pursuit because we should
be concerned about the appropriate answer to the question: What
is privacy to the people it protects?
Themes
that
are
invoked
repeatedly
throughout
constitutional, statutory, and common law approaches to the
protection of privacy include: (1) the right to be let aloneSamuel Warren and Louis Brandeis' famous formulation for the
right to privacy; (2) limited access to the self-the ability to
shield oneself from unwanted access by others; (3) secrecy-the
concealment of certain matters from others; (4) control over
personal information-the ability to exercise control over
information about oneself; (5) personhood-the protection of one's
personality, individuality, and dignity; and (6) intimacy-control
over, or limited access to, one's intimate relationships or aspects
of life. 198 Generally, the essential elements overlapping the areas
of common law privacy involve the offensive nature of the
intrusion or disclosure, whether there is a legitimate reason for
the disclosure, and whether the information is of a private
nature.199

(recognizing a woman's right to have an abortion before fetal viability without undue
interference from the state); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 689-90
(1977) (recognizing a right to sell or distribute contraceptives); Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 498-99 (1977) (recognizing a right of extended family
members to live together); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447-49 (1972) (recognizing a right of individuals, regardless of
marital status, to use contraception); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)
(recognizing a right to marry); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)
(recognizing a right of married couples to use contraception); Skinner v. Oklahoma
ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (recognizing a right to avoid sterilization
on the ground that "[miarriage and procreation are fundamental to the very
existence and survival of the race").
19 See generally Warren & Brandeis, supra note 179.
'9'See generally id,; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
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More generally, there are three dimensions of privacy: (1) a
physical aspect capable of invasion of space or self, (2) an
informational aspect capable of invasion through unauthorized
disclosure, and (3) a decisional aspect capable of invasion by force
of authority, technological fiat, or formal and informal power.
Each dimension of privacy represents an instance where control
over disclosure of self is the interest that privacy protects. 200 But,
unlike informational aspects of privacy,2 °' the protection of space
and self from physical invasion and the protection of individual
decision making from forms of authoritative restriction evoke the
desire to protect disclosures of self as much as expressing the
desire to protect the self against unauthorized invasion or
exposure of thoughts, sensations, emotions, or identifying
portraiture (for example, the dignity of choosing to raise a child
as a Muslim rather than a Christian). °2 Ostensibly, these
interests concern how we relate to each other in a society that
respects individual liberty and free expression through
communication in the public sphere.2 ° '
Privacy is a liberty interest. 2 4
Like liberty, privacy
presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought,
belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. When assessing
the liberty interest at stake when an individual's privacy might
be threatened by state conduct, it is important to frame the

See Cohen, supra note 181, at 1377.
Informational privacy is "an individual's claim to control the terms under
which personal information-information identifiable to the individual-is acquired,
200

201

disclosed, and used." Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1205 (1998) (quoting INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK
FORCE, PRIVACY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: PRINCIPLES
FOR PROVIDING AND USING PERSONAL INFORMATION (1995)).

202See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The
Troubling Implications of a Right To Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 1049, 1102 (2000).
20o To be sure, freedom of expression is, itself, a liberty-sustaining value.
Difficult questions, however, arise when not speaking or not being spoken to is also
liberty enhancing by being both a right of expression and a right of privacy. See, e.g.,
David G. Post, Pooling Intellectual Capital: Thoughts on Anonymity, Pseudonymity,
and Limited Liability in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 147-48; Lee Tien,
Who's Afraid of Anonymous Speech? McIntyre and the Internet, 75 OR. L. REV. 117,
120 (1996).
204 The concept of liberty embodied in Fourteenth Amendment embraces
liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment, such as those relating to religion. See,
e.g., Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760 n.3
(1973); Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
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question at issue in a manner that is not tautological and that
does not, ipso facto, undercut the scope of the interest." 5
Consistent with the Court's narrowcasting of privacy rights,
the Court has denominated certain important interests as
protecting parental privacy; the first cases recognizing the
constitutional right of family privacy involved state intrusions
upon families. The Supreme Court laid the framework for the
constitutional right of parental privacy in Meyer v. Nebraska"6
and Pierce v. Society of Sisters0 7 in the early 1920s. These cases
established that parents had the right to make decisions
concerning the educational welfare of their children. 20
As a
result, parents, ostensibly, were afforded a privacy right of
protection from state intrusion into the family unit.20 9 The Court
moved closer to granting an express right of privacy in Prince v.

20.In drawing the scope of the liberty interest at stake, courts must be mindful
of the potential far-reaching consequences upon private human conduct if the state
could invade the dignity of free persons without boundaries or limitations upon
government access to our private lives. The application of fundamental rights
ostensibly imposes a basic limitation circumscribing the scope of government power:
the majority may act through the power of the legislature, but may not compel an
individual to forfeit a fundamental right unless the government's interest is
sufficiently substantial to overcome the individual right.
206 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
207 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Despite the fact that the framework of constitutional
privacy was laid down during the early twentieth century, it has continued to
successfully weather highly destructive storms. See, for example, Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-95 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003), where the Court found that no fundamental right was implicated
although the challenged state action-laws prohibiting homosexual conduct as
sodomy-threatened to deprive the individual of a means of intimate sexual
expression. Likewise, in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 121, 127 (1989), the
Court found that no fundamental right existed, although the stakes of the
governmental action included the extinguishment of a biological father's established
relationship with his daughter and his complete exclusion from her life.
208 But cf. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?". Meyer and
Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 997 (1992) (arguing
that Meyer and Pierce "were animated ... by... a conservative attachment to the
patriarchal family, to a class-stratified society, and to a parent's private property
rights in his children and their labor").
209 The Court has determined that the state has an interest in the family
because it is the basic unit of socialization and education. See, e.g., Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 399 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) ("The State, representing
the collective expression of moral aspirations, has an undeniable interest in
ensuring that its rules of domestic relations reflect the widely held values of its
people.").
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2 1 ° by holding that the family unit, in the confines
Massachusetts
of the home, cannot be subject to state intrusion.2 1'
Defining parental privacy has proven to be no easy task for
courts. Similar to the right of privacy in different contexts,
assurance of the right within the family unit depends on the
limit of the state's legitimate interest in regulating matters that
would otherwise run afoul of parental privacy. This has been
difficult to determine partly because the federal constitutional
right of privacy is often analyzed under the jurisprudence of
the Fourth Amendment regardless of whether, under the
particular circumstances, this jurisprudence is well-suited to
encompass issues arising from parental decisions concerning the
educational welfare of their children. 212 But regardless of these
jurisprudential shortcomings and qualifications, a distinctive
principle of the Fourth Amendment is its embodiment of a
more outright balancing approach to privacy protection.2 3
Although the Court has obscured this balancing occasionally by
adopting rules demarcating certain police practices as per se
unreasonable, the core of the Fourth Amendment is neither a
warrant nor probable cause, but rather, is reasonableness.2 14
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,"5 the Court allowed Amish parents to
exclude children from compulsory schooling, recognizing parents'

321 U.S. 158 (1944).
See id. at 164-66. The Supreme Court has long recognized that parents have
a liberty interest in familial relations, which includes the right to "establish a home
and bring up children" and "to control the education of their own." Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65
(2000) (noting that the right to familial relations is "the oldest of the fundamental
liberty interests recognized").
212 This is not to say that search and seizure law is never relevant. See, e.g.,
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
213 See, e.g., Rod Dixon, When Efforts To Conceal May Actually Reveal: Whether
First Amendment Protection of Encryption Source Code and the Open Source
Movement Support Re-Drawing the Constitutional Line Between the First
Amendment and Copyright, 1 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 3 (2000), available at
http://www.stlr.orghtml/volumel/encryption.pdf (noting that there is also an aspect
of privacy, whereby, human dignity and personal autonomy are protected through
confidential privilege), The privilege against self-incrimination is one example; the
right to bodily integrity is another-precluding certain drug tests under the Fourth
Amendment, for example. Similarly, the right to conceal one's thoughts-even if
those thoughts are recorded on paper or electronically-is an aspect of personal
autonomy protected through confidential privilege. Id.
214 See, e.g., id. (noting that in the Fourth Amendment context, an intrusion
against privacy is evaluated with reference to the concept of reasonableness).
210
211

215 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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free expression rights.21 6
The decision is considered both
landmark and controversial due to its recognition and definition
of parental rights under the Free Exercise Clause and its bold
invalidation of an apparently neutral and generally applicable
law. The Court defined parents' rights to free exercise of religion
as inclusive of the parental privacy right to establish a home and
raise children under the control and direction of parents and
their beliefs.2 17
Yoder is the first case where the Court, ostensibly, found
parental privacy coextensive with the right to religious
expression. In explaining why strict scrutiny applied to the
Wisconsin law, the Court expressly referred to the law's burden
on the claimants' Free Exercise rights.218 Moreover, the Court
pointed out that the result would be otherwise if the parents
were motivated by "secular considerations" in objecting to
sending their children to school, thus, implying that the law's
interference with autonomy in the parents' child-rearing
decisions alone would not have been enough to trigger strict
scrutiny. 19
Similarly, Pierce stands for the general liberty-based
proposition that children may not be forced to attend public
schools.2 20 There, two operators of private schools, the Society of
the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary and the Hill
Military Academy, sought and secured injunctions against
Oregon's enforcement of a state law requiring public school
216Id. at 234.
217 See id. at 232-34; see also HAMILTON, supra note 123, at 219-20 (arguing
that Yoder should have been overruled, not precisely because of the right of parental
privacy issue, but rather for the decision's repudiation of the rule of law and its
support of mandatory religious accommodation).
The common law secures to each individual the right of determining,
ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be
communicated to others.... [Elven if he has chosen to give them
expression, he generally retains the power to fix the limits of the publicity
which shall be given them.
Cf Warren & Brandeis, supra note 179, at 198 (footnote omitted). The common law
recognized that one did not necessarily forfeit a privacy interest in matters made
part of the public record, however, the privacy interest was diminished and another
who obtained the facts from the public record might be privileged to publish it. See
Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1975) ("[T]he interests in privacy
fade when the information involved already appears on the public record.").
216 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 219.
219 See id. at 215.
220 See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
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attendance.22 ' Ultimately, the Court struck down the state law,
upholding the right of parents to send their children to private
school throughout the adolescent years. 2" The holding included
the Court's determination that the Oregon law interfered with
the right of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing of
2 23

their children.

Not surprisingly, autonomy of choice is recognized in both
religious expression and parental decision-making.
This
reinforces the liberty interest of parents in rearing their children,
which is enhanced rather than diminished when religious
freedom and parental privacy are treated as coordinate
constitutional values.
Questions of liberty, freedom, and religion that traverse the
classroom and enter the courtroom involve difficult cases that
should not be resolved by resorting to the Establishment Clause
in isolation. Instead, these cases must be resolved in light of the
full scope of the liberty interest at stake, which includes the right
of parental privacy. It should be axiomatic that parents may rely
upon an independent, fundamental right of parental privacy to
safeguard them from state actions implicating religion and the
educational welfare of their children. Indeed, given the risks of
majoritarian tyranny by a numerically dominant political
majority, our understanding of a liberty-centered right of
parental privacy should serve to illuminate the conflicting
interests at issue in cases involving religious practices in public
schools.
Courts must climb the appropriate legal pedestals with the
goal of humanizing our legal system's scattered theories and
appropriately maximizing parental interests where they matter
most. The issue disputed in Newdow may take us far toward
finding a way out of some of the conceptual approaches currently
in use, yet largely failing to resolve conflicts arising from illicit
state-sponsored religious practices in public school.224

221 See id. at 531-35.
222 See id. at 534-36.
223

See id.

224

See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Parades, Public Squares and Voucher Payments:

Problems of Government Neutrality, 28 CONN. L. REV. 243, 244-47 (1996);
Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out": Assimilation,
Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 581,
600-04 (1993); George W. Dent, Jr., Of God and Caesar: The Free Exercise Rights
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III. CONCLUSION
An assessment of the liberty interest threatened by state
conduct must be framed in a manner that is neither tautological
nor outcome deterministic. In drawing the scope of the liberty
interest at stake, courts must be mindful that the resolution of
claims presenting liberty interests may involve far-reaching
consequences upon private human conduct when the state is
given authority to invade the dignity of free persons without
unambiguous limitations upon government access to our private
lives.
Assessing challenges to state actions implicating religion in
public education by filtering the strength of the asserted interest
of the parent or child through the lens of protections of parental
privacy reinforces the constitutional injunction against the
state's forcing any individual to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion-including a religious doctrine that receives majority
support by the polity. When state actions implicating religion
permissibly occur inside the public schoolhouse, the integration
of parental privacy protections with the limits on state power
imposed by the Establishment and Religious Freedom Clauses
properly ensures that the government is required to successfully
surmount the requisite constitutional hurdles by showing that
the competing interests of children, parents, and the state can be
carefully balanced in the state's favor.
That the freedom of religious expression and the right of
privacy are interrelated in a manner that favors both is not a
novel idea; many Americans have long understood religion to be
a personal and private affair shielded from restriction and
interference by the state. The laws of parental privacy and the
anti-establishment of religion are fundamentally concerned with
serious violations of certain forms of personhood and human
dignity, namely those that threaten an individual's free
will and independence. In the public school context, alleged
Establishment Clause violations must be assessed against both
the strength of the parental right of privacy at stake as well as
the coercive tendency of student participation in a schoolsponsored religious exercise. In this light, even school-sponsored
religious exercises having arguably nominal coercive impact upon
of Public School Students, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 707, 707-23 (1993); David
Bernstein, Why Johnny Can't Pray, REASON, Feb. 1992, at 56.
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students will not pass constitutional scrutiny where a widelyacknowledged parental right of privacy is at stake. The stronger
the parental right of privacy, the less tolerant a court must be in
its assessment of the degree of coercion permitted in the schoolsponsored religious exercise. The Court should make it plain
that a wall of separation divides ceremonial celebration from
religious indoctrination, which means children cannot be coerced
into pledging to God while getting a public education.

